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REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 93, Part II, 19 May 2003
RETHINKING THE BALKANS
By Patrick Moore
At a time when some long-accepted rules of the international
order and in trans-Atlantic relations are being reexamined, one
expert on Balkan affairs has called on the international community to
take a fresh look at some of its basic operating assumptions in the
Western Balkans. One of his conclusions is that costly protectorates
in both Kosova and Bosnia-Herzegovina are untenable in the long run,
and that it is wise to address the issue sooner rather than later.
A. Ross Johnson, who is a research fellow at the Hoover
Institution and a consultant with RFE/RL, has just published "An
Assessment of the Decade of Western Peace-keeping and Nation-building
in the Balkans" with the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson
International Center (http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1422).
He notes that considerable progress has been made in the
former Yugoslav region over the past decade, but that stability is
"uneasy" in Macedonia and that Kosova and Bosnia remain
international
protectorates. Johnson suggests that time has come to reexamine six
basic assumptions on promoting stability and democracy lest
continuing with more of the same leads to results very different from
those desired by the international community.
First, he notes that facts have not borne out the
long-standing assumption that time will permit a consensus to emerge
throughout the region regarding the breakup of former Yugoslavia and
the subsequent conflicts. Johnson calls for "much more effort...to
confront the past and find common truth as a basis for regional
reconciliation," focusing "primarily but not exclusively on Serbia"
and the Bosnian Serbs.
The second assumption he challenges is that the work of the
Hague-based war crimes tribunal will help contribute to development
of a shared perspective on recent history. Johnson notes that sending
some particularly nasty individuals to The Hague has prevented them
from causing further trouble at home. He adds, however, that the
tribunal has been costly and has provided some of those indicted with
a forum to publicize their views. Moreover, Johnson argues that
conducting the trials in The Hague and with foreign judges has
"served as an excuse to duck local responsibility for dealing with
war crimes and political disaster."
As an alternative, he suggests that international courts
could be "linked" to local truth and reconciliation commissions in a
process that would involve both foreign and local judges. This is in
keeping with one of Johnson's underlying arguments, namely that time
has come to let the people in the region assume an ever-greater share
of the responsibility for their own futures.
A third point that Johnson raises is the assumption that
"states can be 'built' from the outside and top down." He cites the
immense costs of peacekeeping and of promoting political and economic
development as unsustainable in the long run. Kosova and Bosnia have
consumed most of this assistance, to the detriment of "support for
democratic transition elsewhere, especially in Serbia."
"A fourth assumption is that international forces deployed in
the Western Balkans can continue to be reduced incrementally and one
day will be removed entirely." Johnson argues that "major structural
and political change is required in [Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosova]
before international military forces can be withdrawn without
inducing renewed instability. The mission of these forces will not be
completed by inertia."
His fifth issue is the assumption that multiethnic societies
can be restored. Johnson believes that this is "impractical in
concept and counterproductive in implementation" where refugee
returns are concerned. Again, he argues that attention has been
misdirected and would better be spent on resettling and integrating
refugees in their new homes, as was done with displaced and expelled
Germans after World War II. He cites the Serbian refugees in Serbia
as being in particular need of assistance.
The final assumption that Johnson examines is that borders
are sacrosanct and that "current administrative units in Southeastern
Europe must be maintained at any cost. The corollary is that larger
units are better than smaller ones...and that any change in borders
will make matters worse rather than better."
Johnson notes that many of the frontiers are arbitrary ones
drawn by communist leaders for their own purposes at the end of World
War II, including those of Kosova and Bosnia. He suggests that the
worldwide trends toward self-determination and majority rule indicate
that independence is the only realistic scenario for Kosova, and that
the issue must be addressed sooner rather than later.
He considers Bosnia's future "more problematic" because it is
a "pretend country of two and often three parts" based on the Dayton
agreement imposed by foreigners and not developed by a Bosnian
constituent assembly.
He offers two alternative models. One involves increased
centralization of what he calls "key state functions" while
devolving
other functions to two entities, which should be less ethnically
based than is the case at present. The other model is a partition,
which, Johnson argues, might prove less politically dangerous now
than in 1995 because nationalist parties have since been swept from
power in both Croatia and Serbia.
Johnson also calls for a clearer roadmap for integrating the
countries of the region into the EU as the best stimulus to peace and
progress. At the same time, he stresses that the countries must
increasingly stand on their own and shed the vestiges of being
international protectorates.
His article is certain to provoke lively discussions on a
number of points. Some critics will argue that local justice is not
yet up to trying major war criminals, and that only The Hague can
deal with someone like Milosevic. Other critics will challenge
Johnson's views on refugee returns and the reconstruction of
multiethnic societies.
As to borders, the EU in particular remains firmly wedded to
the idea of the inviolability of existing frontiers -- to the point
of forcing a union on Serbia and Montenegro in 2002. Despite a series
of changes in leadership, Belgrade doggedly pursues the fiction that
it has a future in Kosova, even though some Serbian leaders might say
otherwise in private.
Some observers, moreover, will ask how Bosnia might indeed be
better and democratically reorganized short of partition. Others will
say that partition is as impractical now as it was in 1995 because it
would still create an nonviable Muslim rump state that would become a
magnet for unsavory influences from the Middle East. Still other
critics will ask whether it is in the interest of the United States
to continue to support EU expansion into the "New Europe".
These issues, like many others on the op-ed pages of the
American and European press, are not likely to be resolved soon. But
at a time when a number of long-accepted as fundamental assumptions
in international relations are widely being reconsidered, it might be
particularly prudent to examine the issues that Johnson's article
raises.
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Peacekeeping
in the Balkans: An Assessment of the Decade
May 08, 2003
In
April 1992 the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) went into Croatia
with a 12-month term and a mission to demilitarize and protect “the
continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local
authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the
achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis.” More than ten
years, thousands of peacekeepers, and hundreds of millions of dollars later,
the former states of Yugoslavia are arguably as far from a political
solution as they ever were. In a recent meeting sponsored by the East
European Studies Program, two Balkans experts, A. Ross Johnson, research
fellow at the Hoover Institution and consultant with RFE/RL; and Misha
Glenny, noted freelance journalist and author and former BBC correspondent,
assessed the past ten years in Southeastern Europe and offered alternative
strategies for the future of the region.
Marty Sletzinger, Director of the East European Studies Program began the
meeting by pointing out the relevance of such an assessment for the
situation today in post-conflict Iraq. “Debate and confusion have emerged
over the possible duration and costs in terms of manpower, military
expenditure and development of the subsequent nation-building exercise
envisaged by the administration. A look at the U.S. and allied experience in
the ongoing nation-building efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo would help to put
the costs and challenges of Iraq into realistic and sobering perspective,”
he said.
In his remarks Misha Glenny offered insights from his recent participation
on a panel looking at why reform had not delivered results since the Dayton
Peace Agreement in 1995. To Glenny, the single largest obstacle to reform is
in convincing the people of Southeastern Europe that they have a stake in
the process and in their future. This turned out to be a common theme
throughout the meeting---that for stability and viability of the states in
the region, the populations must participate fully and feel as if they have
control over their lives.
One of the specific conclusions reached by the panel, Glenny noted, was that
the process for providing assistance to the region had effectively
squandered the money. Aid money has been channeled into central governments
that have become hyper-centralized with the majority of aid going to cover
budget deficits in the capitals or falling into criminal hands. Thus, one of
the key issues the panel discussed was devolution in the region—both
political and fiscal.
A more encouraging development Glenny spoke of was attempts at
reconstituting regional integration as exemplified by a recent meeting he
organized with 4 town mayors from the neighboring areas of Macedonia, Serbia,
Kosovo, and Bulgaria. The mayors spoke of the destruction of the economic
area due to imposition of borders in 1992 and 1999. “The number one
complaint was not problems due to ethnicity or language, but of getting
goods across borders,” Glenny said. The success of this meeting led to a
meeting of 18 town mayors consisting of Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, and
Macedonians. Again, neither the issue of ethnicity or language came up. The
MOU they formulated instead focused on getting their trading routes back
together, “So people whose farms had to be split by the border would be
able to trade as before.” These cross-border mayors were to act as a
pressure group on their central governments to address issues that affect
life outside the capital---areas that receive very little aid.
Overall, the number one problem Glenny cited in the region is the failure of
the international community to follow through with the commitment of
economic aid and development. Furthermore, there is a bold misperception of
what the problems are and the subsequent response. “It is one where
communal conflict is much less significant than people imagine---it is one
where people are enjoined across borders by poverty and underemployment and
they recognize where the problems are. They taught us an enormous amount
about what is going wrong. Reform for people in these areas is at best a
meaningless concept. At worst it is central to their misery and their sense
of despair.”
Another major obstacle to reform and to the possibility of development in
Southeastern Europe is the problem of perception, public relations, and
communications. “This whole question about perception has a really
damaging economic and social impact on the region,” Glenny said. To combat
this it is critical to point out successes such as the mayor initiative,
Glenny noted.
A procedural problem that has wide-reaching destructive effects is apparent
in the political process; specifically the running of campaigns and
elections. According to Glenny, you cannot run a campaign unless you have
substantial funds and the only place to get the funds is from corrupt and
criminalized interests. The result is the partial, if not total capture of
the state by corrupt interests. “What we have never funded is the key
issue of the political process itself and that is something that has to
change.”
On a positive note, the EU is taking a more nuanced approach to the problems
of the Balkans with the new European Stability Initiative founded by young
Austrian experts on the region working closely with the Office of the High
Representative. They have looked at the problems of chronic
de-industrialization and rural underdevelopment and have begun to come up
with solutions. The bottom line is that Europe and the U.S. need to start
looking at the Balkans not primarily as a region of ethnic complexity and
conflict but also as one of social and economic complexity as well. He
warned that the depth of the social and economic crisis can provoke further
instability in the region.
Glenny emphasized that the magnet of EU integration has been and will be a
powerful motor for helping to reform all the nations of Southeast Europe,
citing the recent progress made in Romania and Bulgaria as a result of the
pull of EU membership. The fundamental problem, in his view, is how to get
the former Yugoslav states into a situation vis-ŕ-vis the European Union
where Romania and Bulgaria (slated for EU membership by the year 2007) are
today, and this needs to be done by the year 2004 at the latest.
The critical point Glenny emphasized is that instability in Southeast Europe
continues to be fueled by the existence of unstable and unsustainable
political entities in the region. He noted that the current Union of Serbia/Montenegro
has no future as a country. Its existence is solely the result of the effort
of the EU to deal with this region as expeditiously as possible. Glenny also
noted that despite valiant efforts, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
remain dysfunctional entities that cannot exist by themselves without an
international peacekeeping presence and political leadership provided by the
international community. The problem here is a kind of catch-22. Most
observers agree that the pull of EU integration could eventually help to
resolve the underlying issues that make Bosnia and Kosovo so unstable,
notably incompatible ethnic minorities and the need for large-scale economic
transformation. The problem is, in Glenny’s words, that the EU will not
admit dysfunctional states. So, what is needed is a constitutional
resolution of the status and functioning of these states before the EU can
act effectively on their behalf. This will mean that at some point there
will be a need to “cut the gordian knot” of the status of Kosovo and
perhaps move beyond the Dayton framework for Bosnia.
Finally, addressing the issue of conditionality and the ongoing Hague War
Crimes Tribunal, Glenny emphasized that so far the results of this process
have largely been negative. Whereas many factors were involved in the
assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic, the pressure from the War
Crimes Tribunal to produce further indictees may have played a role as well.
He urged the U.S. and the international community to rethink the issue of
conditionality, which he claimed was undermining the efforts of true
democrats and reformers in both Serbia and Croatia to achieve desired
results and to hold right-wing nationalist parties at bay.
Ross Johnson, long-time and well-
respected
expert on Yugoslavia and the Balkans, elaborated upon six assumptions that
have guided the U.S. and international approach to the former Yugoslavia,
and which now need to be reconsidered or changed. The first assumption is
that there has been some degree of understanding and reconciliation emerging
among the peoples of the region following the wars and conflict of the
1990s. Johnson claims that this is not the case and that very little
convergence or understanding exists. For example, he noted Serbs still feel
like victims and the Croats feel they were victimized by the Serbs. He
praised a recent program hosted by Radio Free Europe that brought opposing
groups together to discuss issues in a reasonable discourse. “More of this
is needed,” he said.
Second is the assumption that this so-called mutual understanding has been
facilitated and hastened by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. Again, Johnson
emphasized that in fact the opposite is the case and agreed with Glenny that
the pressure of the court certainly played a role in the assassination of
Prime Minister Djindjic. He noted that the tribunal has played a positive
role in getting bad people out of the region, but the court, he regretted,
is outliving whatever usefulness it had and is costing far too much money
(in the hundreds of millions) that might better be spent on other issues in
the region.
The third assumption concerns nation building and the notion that a state,
whether it is Bosnia or, in the future, Kosovo, can be built from the
outside – in other words using outside resources, pressure and help.
Johnson stressed that this approach in the long run will not work. In the
end analysis, states can only be built from within and from the “consent
of the governed and the people that live within the state.”
The fourth assumption concerns the limited role and duration of peacekeeping
forces. In Johnson’s view, while the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and
Kosovo have played an important role in overcoming the “internal security
deficit” in these regions, unless there is more success in
nation-building, it is hard to see how these peacekeeping missions will ever
be completed. As for Bosnia, according to Johnson, as long as the Dayton
peace process remains in place, the NATO-led SFOR peacekeeping force or some
successor force, however reduced in size, will need to be there forever, it
would seem. This is not necessarily a bad thing, just a piece of reality
that the U.S. and its allies need to accept. There is simply no internal
stability without outside peacekeeping forces. He considers it a very
dangerous assumption that with inertia, with maintaining the status quo
politically, we continue to expect the number of troops to shrink each year.
The fifth assumption is morally the most difficult---that it is possible to
recreate multi-ethnicity in war-torn states that used to be multi-ethnic.
Johnson believes that in reality it is very difficult to recreate such
multi-ethnicity and to put broken states back together. A significant
problem has been and will remain whether significant amounts of refugees
will be able to return to their home areas, and in the case of Bosnia it
looks like at least 50 percent will never return. This will undermine future
efforts at multi-ethnicity. The same problem exists for Kosovo, to which, in
his view, it is highly unlikely significant numbers of ethnic Serbs will
ever be able or willing to return. Also worth noting is the important
distinction between refugee resettlement and return and refugee return
versus minority return. The OHR has defined a ‘return’ as a refugee who
returns for one single night---“but the important part is what happens
after that.” He believes that more resources should be focused on
resettlement rather than simply on returns.
Finally, the sixth assumption, and the most difficult and most important, is
the issue of the future architecture and constitutional order of the region.
Ultimately, Johnson regretted, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are not
really viable states, either on their own or with a continued peacekeeping
presence. He emphasized that in the whole region of the former Yugoslavia,
and in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the international community
is dealing with arbitrary borders. Johnson stressed that he did not see how
these states as currently constituted will ever be able to act as sovereign,
independent states. Bosnia, in his view, resembles “pretend land” where
virtually all-important decisions have been imposed by the High
Representative. It is difficult to see how this situation can be altered in
the near or middle term, even if as threatened, the EU decides to terminate
the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, when the current holder’s
mandate, the UK’s Paddy Ashdown, ends in about two years.
Both Glenny and Johnson concluded that the viability of both Bosnia and
Kosovo depends on a consensual, indigenous political solution coupled with
real economic development and stabilization, strategies that are not
currently being pursued. It seems that the general approach is to put off
dealing with the status of the two states-possibly the most irresponsible
course of all.
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 94, Part II, 20 May 2003
SERBIAN
PRIME MINISTER CALLS KOSOVA PART OF SERBIA. Zoran Zivkovic
told the German weekly "Der Spiegel" of 19 May that there is
no
international agreement justifying the independence of Kosova.
Confronted with the statement that neither a European government nor
Washington would agree to Kosova becoming part of Serbia again,
Zivkovic countered: "Again? Kosova is part of Serbia. That is not a
question of Europe's or the United States' mercy." Zivkovic also
charged that the international community has failed to fulfill its
obligations regarding Kosova. "There is no progress in the return
of
Serbian refugees, no security for the Serbs [in Kosova], and the
promised decentralization did not take place," Zivkovic said.
"The
situation is unacceptable. The Albanians are destabilizing Kosova
with the help of the international community." Zivkovic is
scheduled
to visit Brussels and Berlin this week. UB
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 93, Part II, 19 May 2003
DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS U.S. WILL
REMAIN IN THE BALKANS. During
a short visit to the Camp Bondsteel U.S. military base in Kosova on
17 May, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said the United
States will maintain its military presence in the Balkans until the
region has stabilized, RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian Languages
Service reported. In neighboring Macedonia, Wolfowitz met the same
day with President Boris Trajkovski and Prime Minister Branko
Crvenkovski to discuss Macedonia's bid for NATO accession and the
proposed extradition-immunity agreement (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
16
May 2003). UB
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 92, Part II, 16 May 2003
U.S.
TO RALLY BALKAN SUPPORT FOR EXTRADITION-IMMUNITY PACTS. U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz began a four-day European
trip on 16 May aimed in part at encouraging Bosnia and Macedonia to
sign bilateral extradition-immunity agreements with the United States
prohibiting the handover of each other's citizens to the
International Criminal Court (ICC), the BBC's Serbian Service
reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 9 and 15 May 2003). He will
also
meet with U.S. SFOR peacekeepers in Tuzla, RFE/RL's South Slavic and
Albanian Languages Service noted. Other stations on his journey are
Kosova, Romania, and France. An unnamed Macedonian government
official told dpa on 15 May that Washington has warned Macedonia, as
it has Bosnia and Croatia, that failure to conclude an agreement by 1
July could lead to a cutoff of U.S. military aid. The official added
that the parliament must approve any extradition-immunity agreement.
Alexis Brouhns, the EU's chief representative in Skopje, said on 16
May, "Macedonia will become a member of the EU, and...should not sign
a deal with [the United States] which would exclude American citizens
[from] prosecution by the ICC." PM
MACEDONIAN ALBANIAN TEENAGERS DEMAND BETTER
SCHOOLS. Some 5,000
ethnic Albanian high-school students demonstrated in Kumanovo on 16
May to protest what they say is the inferior quality of their school
buildings compared to those of ethnic Macedonians, dpa reported. The
protest followed the students' unsuccessful attempt to return to the
school building they left during the unrest in 2001. The Education
Ministry promised to resolve the matter before the start of the fall
semester. The news agency noted that unnamed "international human
rights groups" have charged that unnamed nationalist groups have
previously exploited student protests for their own ends. PM
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SLAMS KOSOVA PARLIAMENT'S RESOLUTION.
Michael
Steiner, who heads the UN civilian administration in Kosova (UNMIK),
told the BBC on 15 May that a resolution passed earlier that day by
the parliament is divisive and a violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 on Kosova. The resolution declares the 1998-99
conflict in Kosova to have been a "liberation war of the people of
Kosova for freedom and independence." The text adds that the
"NATO
war, led by the [United States, was]...a war against the violence and
genocide of the Serbian authorities." Steiner said he has spoken to
senior officials of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, who told him that
Kosova's elected representatives will not be invited to several
upcoming meetings sponsored by those three organizations. Legislators
belonging to the Serbian Povratak (Return) coalition walked out of
the parliamentary vote. Oliver Ivanovic, who is a member of the
parliament's Presidency, said the resolution is a clear message to
Serbian refugees that they are not welcome to return to Kosova. He
stressed that a "dialogue" is the only way to improve the
situation
in the province (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2003). PM
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On November 28, 2002, Albanians all over the world celebrated Albania’s
Independence Day. President Alfred Moisiu; Prime Minister Fatos Nano;
opposition leader Sali Berisha; the Prime Minister of Kosova Bajram Rexhepi;
former KLA leaders, now party leaders, Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj;
the leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians in Macedonia, Arben Xhaferri;
and, representatives of Albanians in Montenegro and abroad, all gathered in
the southern port of Vlore, where 90 years ago Albanian patriots declared
Albania’s independence. Such a gathering was seen by some politicians and
analysts in the region as further proof that Albanians are working for the
creation of a “Greater Albania.”
Whether one takes such statements seriously or not, there is widespread
recognition among experts of Balkan affairs that it is the Albanian Question
– broadly defined as the nationalist aspirations of some six million
Albanians – that posses the greatest challenge to peace and stability in
the region. If the Albanian issue is not managed properly, there is a
potential for significant violence and upheaval in Kosova, Macedonia and
Serbia-Montenegro.
Albanian National Revival
Albanians are witnessing an era of national revival – they have entered a
period of greater ethnic assertiveness. There are several factors that have
contributed to this growing assertiveness.
First, developments in Kosova, southern Serbia and Macedonia and the
significant violence that has accompanied them are part of the bigger,
unfinished business in the Balkans – the continuation of the
disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. Albanians only now are grappling
with some of the same issues that their neighbors attempted to address much
earlier.
Albanians in former Yugoslavia had legitimate political, economic and
cultural grievances. They were never treated, nor did they view themselves,
as equal with other ethnic groups. As a result, they had – and continue to
have – a low commitment to the state. Social, religious and cultural
differences with their Yugoslav neighbors existed even during Tito’s
Yugoslavia. There is also a centuries old history of domination and harsh
repression by neighbors. This historic experience has molded both Albanians
and their Slav neighbors into seemingly incompatible political cultures with
clashing belief systems, hopes and fears.
Demographic developments have also played an important role in shaping
current Albanian national identity. This is a young, restless population of
6 million, where the average age is 26. Despite being separated for a very
long time by international borders and having lived under different
political systems, Albanians throughout the region are bound by common
cultural characteristics, a shared history and a deep rooted consciousness
of national identity. The downfall of communism, the war in Kosova and the
rapid advances in information technology as well as the erosion of
government control over information, have combined to transform the
relationship between Albanians in the region, restoring old ties and
fostering new types of community relations. Today’s Albanian community is
characterized by close relations and increased interaction across all
fields.
Strengthening this renewed sense of kingship and adding to the growing
frustration and increasing assertiveness of the Albanian community is the
fact that the areas where Albanians live are the most economically
underdeveloped in the region. Unemployment is very high and large segments
of the population, especially in the countryside, are trapped in severe
poverty. There is growing economic insecurity, corruption, organized crime,
and trafficking. Local public institutions lack the will and capacity to
address these problems.
Significance of these Trends
Taken together, these trends make for a dangerous and explosive scenario. So
is a “Greater Albania” in the making? In this author’s view, a unitary,
traditional, sovereign state that would include most, overwhelmingly
Albanian-inhabited territories, which would necessitate changes of current
international borders and the establishment of a central government in
Tirana, is not in the cards in the immediate future. The region in question
is under virtual NATO control. Kosova and Macedonia, and in certain respects
even Albania, are NATO protectorates. The Albanians are too weak militarily
and economically to impose their will, even if they were indeed seeking to
create a ‘”Greater Albania,” which is not the case.
While there are groups and movements which advocate the unification of all
Albanian lands, they are marginalized and enjoy little popular support.
There is no well organized, pan-Albanian movement, no Albanian “center”
or “leader” recognized by all the others. Elites in Albania, Kosova, and
western Macedonia have different priorities and tend to take independent
action. Albanian leaders and public opinion seem to indicate an
understanding that they could only be marginalized from any moves toward
“Greater Albania,” while they would greatly benefit from greater
regional cooperation, open borders and free exchanges. As a result, there is
the emergence of a remarkable consensus between decision-makers and
political actors in Tirana, Prishtina, and Tetova: Albanians have laid out a
forward looking, pro-Western agenda. Euro-Atlantic integration has become
the keystone of Albanian policies.
Nevertheless, there is still a potential for violence and regional
instability. Albanians are not likely to give up on their dream of an
independent Kosova state or on a greater share of power in Macedonia. This
is likely to lead them into open conflict with their neighbors. While
Albanian nationalism may not be a powerful force in Albania proper, it
remains very strong among Albanians in Kosova, Macedonia, southern Serbia,
and Montenegro. There are strong forces at work competing with one another;
Serbian nationalism, despite the devastating wars of the 1990s and
Milosevic’s downfall, has not been defeated. Serbia has yet to resign
itself to the loss of Kosova. Some Serbs still dream of Serbian troops
marching back into Kosova and perhaps other parts of former Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, Macedonian Slavs are on the defensive, under tremendous political
and social pressure from the cohabiting Albanians to develop power-sharing
mechanisms in the government and society at large. For Albanians in
Southeast Europe, these two key issues of Kosova and Macedonia must be
addressed to allow for regional cooperation and stability.
Kosova
In Kosova, Albanians are focused on reviving their society and building
institutions. There is a broad acceptance that there will be no border
changes as well as a general acceptance of Special Representative for the
Secretary General Michael Steiner’s benchmarks. These are a set of general
principles that must shape the future of Kosova and which include rule of
law, multi-ethnic society, tolerance, and democratic governance, and
transparency.
The honeymoon with the international community, however, is over. Albanians
are becoming increasingly impatient and frustrated with UNMIK and they are
pushing for a speedy transfer of power from the international administration
to local institutions. Albanians are determined to gain independence.
The crux of this independence movement is the desire not for a “Greater
Albania” but for an independent Kosova state. The Kosovar elite is less
enthusiastic than in the past about unification with Albania. There is
self-interest in pushing for an independent Kosova state – the elite
recognize that they cannot play the same leadership role in a “Greater
Albania.” Of greatest concern is the fear that any move toward unification
with Albania will lead to the partition of Kosova, especially regarding
Mitrovica. Recent trends even indicate efforts to develop a separate
national identity – President Rugova has urged that Kosova create its own
flag, national anthem, and national day, all different from those of Albania.
Uncertainty regarding final status, however, encourages extreme forces in
both the Slav and Albanian communities. There are several options open for
the final status of Kosova, but only one that truly addresses, in this
author’s opinion, the situation on the ground and the aspirations for
self-determination of the majority population in Kosova: independence. Other
options include the possibility of an indefinite protectorate of the
international community – unrealistic given the available limited
resources and the refocus of security interests to Iraq and Central Asia –
partition, or reintegration with Yugoslavia. Both of the latter two options
are strongly resisted by the Kosovar Albanians and, if implemented, could
result in the outbreak of another conflict.
Macedonia
Despite the Ohrid Agreement negotiated by the U.S. and the European Union
and the recent elections, the situation in Macedonia remains fragile. The
Ohrid Agreement provides a formula that seemingly reconciles Albanian
demands for greater rights with Macedonians’ desire for a unified state.
But implementation of the agreement is very problematic. The solution was
imposed by the international community; to succeed, it will require
continued engagement.
The two communities continue to see the situation in terms of a zero-sum
game. Inter-ethnic relations are plagued by poor mutual understanding.
Macedonians consider the Albanians as separatists and, therefore, a threat
to the existence of the state of Macedonia. Albanians, on the other hand,
feel victimized by the government and feel systematically discriminated
against.
Macedonia faces daunting challenges. Beyond the immediate feasibility
question of the power-sharing state framework, there are several other
unresolved issues, including the country’s relationship with its neighbors
– Albania, Kosova, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria – an economy devastated by
the communist legacy and the hardships of privatization and incomplete
reforms, organized crime and corruption, and a general absence of law and
order. In addition, Macedonia’s political landscape has changed
dramatically. With the Fall 2002 elections, Ali Ahmeti has dislodged Arben
Xhaferri as the main Albanian leader in Macedonia. As part of a coalition
government led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, Ahmeti says he is
committed to a unified Macedonia. Thus far, he has proven to be a man of his
word, but the future remains uncertain. If both sides make genuine efforts
to implement the Ohrid Agreement, and with sustained international
assistance, Macedonia has a chance of surviving as a unified state. Until
now, however, Macedonia has not shown the institutional or leadership
ability to deal with the complex challenges the country faces.
The Role of Albania
Albania has traditionally been too weak and too dependent on the outside
world to play the traditional role of a “mother country” to all
Albanians in the region. Largely a dysfunctional state, Albania is a poor
country with limited resources, which continues to suffer from a lack of
rule of law. To add to an already painful transition to democracy and a
market system, in 1997 the country was racked by a failed pyramid scheme
that devastated the fragile economy and sent it spiraling into violence.
Consequently, over the past ten years, Albanians have not been able to
guarantee a stable political environment with functional democratic
institutions. The country remains heavily dependent on the international
community and the donations of the Albanian diaspora. Thus, it cannot afford
to alienate the West and it remains preoccupied with internal problems.
Nevertheless, Albania has played a constructive regional role. It has not
advocated, or supported, forces which desire a greater Albania. Tirana
leaders have always given priority to the interests of the state of Albania
over those of the wider, Albanian nation. Tirana continues to have different
priorities from those of Prishtina and Tetova. For example, although Albania
has been very supportive of international efforts in Kosova, it discouraged
the uprising in Macedonia. However, a peaceful resolution in Macedonia is
viewed as crucial to Albania’s own national interests, since it directly
impacts stability and security.
Conclusions and Recommendations
From this brief overview, it is clear that the Albanians in the region do
not speak with one political voice, do not have one national platform, and
that Albania is not in a position to play the role of a political “mother
country.” Nevertheless, this author believes it would be a mistake to
exaggerate the differences among the three Albanian centers – Tirana,
Prishtina, and Tetova. The Albanian national idea is not dead. There is more
that unites than divides the Albanians. During the last decade, Albanians
have witnessed profound psychological transformations. There has been a
significant narrowing of differences in mentality, political culture, and
economic and social development between Albania, Kosova, and western
Macedonia. In the long-term, we are likely to see a closer relationship and
coordination of policies. This should not be seen as a threat, as long as it
is done gradually and peacefully.
While future developments will be largely determined by the actions and the
choices that the parties involved will make – the Albanians, the Serbs,
and the Macedonians – the role of the United States and the international
community will remain critical. There are several, immediate areas in
critical need of leadership and direction form the international community,
especially from the United States. Among these and of highest priority is
the issue of the final status of Kosova. This needs to be addressed as soon
as possible. And the United States needs to take the lead. The Kosovars need
to be given a road map on the process with clear indications as to how a
decision will be made on this issue. Benchmarks established by UNMIK still
need to be met before Kosova is granted independence, but having a roadmap
with a final date would do much to marginalize extremists profiting from the
current uncertainty and frustration over lack of status resolution.
In Macedonia, the international community must remain engaged and insist on
the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Extremist forces and
politicians who are no longer in power but who are resorting to nationalist
rhetoric and actions, should be marginalized. To succeed, Macedonia will
require international persistence and increased assistance. In addition, it
will require tough compromises on both sides, including a fundamental shift
in thinking and behavior on both sides – a nurturing of new elite that can
look beyond the narrow interests of their ethnic groups. The new government
of Prime Minister Crvenkovski is a good beginning. The alternative is
unthinkable: more violence and, in the best case, silent partition (a
national government but with two ethnic-based entities).
For its part, Albania has gradually started to turn the corner after the
1997 pyramid crisis. There has been significant economic growth and
inflation has been kept low. There has also been an improvement in law and
order. Relations between the ruling Socialists and opposition Democrats have
improved significantly following an agreement this past summer on a
consensual president – Alfred Moisiu. Democratic progress, however, has
been slow and distorted. Corruption is pervasive and it often involves
senior officials. Drug-money allegations have become common. There is also a
lack of financial transparency.
After the war in Kosova and following the September 11th terrorist attacks,
Albania’s significance has declined. The country does not seem to be
important enough to be the target of significant U.S./EU pressure to make
greater progress in establishing the rule of law and in fighting corruption
and human trafficking. So far, the government has not demonstrated a real
commitment to fight corruption and organized crime. What we essentially have
in Albania today is a self-serving, corrupt elite, that cynically advances
its personal interests, steals resources from its own people, and is
interested only in preserving its positions of power and privileges. The
United States and their European allies should stop issuing complacent
statements and demand that the Socialist government make greater efforts to
undertake pressing domestic reforms. On too many occasions in recent years,
the international community has been unusually, and in my opinion needlessly,
restrained in its criticism of developments in Albania.
Finally, Albanians overall must be considered as an important part of the
U.S./EU vision for the region and included in the international
community’s efforts for the establishment and spread of democracy; the
creations of a multi-ethnic society; the protection of minority rights; and,
the promotion of peaceful conflict-resolution. There must be a promise of
eventual, full integration of the entire region in Euro-Atlantic
institutions. This will provide these lagging countries with an objective to
strive for. This promise of eventual integration must, however, be coupled
with economic assistance. Here, emphasis should be on regional integration,
economic development and open borders, as well as help in establishing the
rule of law and building democratic institutions. Only through sustained
involvement and leadership by the international community, coupled with
economic assistance, a stronger push for regional cooperation and the
promise of eventual integration in European institutions can this region
achieve stability and make a positive contribution to the continent’s
security.
Elez Biberaj spoke at an EES noon discussion on December 4, 2002. The
above is an edited summary of Dr. Biberaj’s presentation prepared by EES
Program Associate, Sabina Auger.
195. Quelling Unification Fears: Post-War Kosovo and Albania
Author: Elez Biberaj, Chief of the Albanian Service for
Voice of America
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The year 1999 was a very traumatic year for the six million Albanians in
the Balkans. Thanks to NATO's intervention and after long years of bad luck,
national tragedy, and economic misery, the future looks relatively bright.
Despite daunting challenges, Albanians in Kosova are finally free of Serbian
repression and can now begin building a new, more stable future. In Albania,
there are some signs of recovery from the 1997 economically-induced
government crash, although politically, it is still pervaded by a lack of
cohesion and direction.
The end of the war in Kosova and the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from the
region has raised concerns in neighboring Balkan countries and in some
Western capitals about the possibility of the emergence of a Greater Albania.
The conventional wisdom holds that the emergence of an independent Kosova
will reignite the old dream of Albanian national unification, thereby
destabilizing and disrupting current efforts to promote peace and stability
in the region. This gives rise to two important questions: Are the Albanians
really working for a Greater Albania? And would Kosova's independence or its
unification with Albania truly have an adverse impact on regional peace and
stability?
To date, after Bosnia, Kosova is the second international protectorate in
the Balkans, although Albania is also a hybrid type of protectorate in its
own right, due to its lack of clear governing authority, its failure to
fully recover from the 1997 collapse, and its continued dependence on
foreign assistance. In Kosova however, UNMIK - the UN mission charged with
the overall responsibility for civil administration, humanitarian affairs,
reconstruction and institution building - has had to start from scratch.
The war left Kosova a wasteland, marred by large-scale, uneven destruction,
an economy at a standstill, a collapsed industry and agriculture, and
non-existent formal financial and legal systems. Yet, despite criticism of
the lagging implementation of reforms and reconstruction programs, UNMIK has
made significant progress in laying the groundwork for rebuilding civil
service structures, establishing the rule of law, and creating a mechanism
for the democratization of Kosovar society. Realizing that it could not
govern without involving the Albanians, in December 1999, UNMIK inaugurated
a new power sharing arrangement - the Transitional Administrative Council of
Kosova - bringing together competing Albanian power centers, dissolving
parallel structures, and allotting spaces for eventual Serb inclusion.
Additionally, two issues widely viewed as the most staggering problems for
post-war Kosova have been largely resolved: the repatriation of Albanian
refugees and the demilitarization of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) and
its transformation into the civilian-based Kosova Protection Corps.
Yet, formidable challenges - among which security ranks highest - remain.
KFOR, the NATO-led peace enforcement force, has not been able to prevent the
ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other minorities, the criminalization of
society, or form an effective local police force.
The economy has also proved challenging. Despite initial large pledges of
economic aid, the international community has been slow in delivering actual
assistance, leading to the UN Chief Administrator in Kosova, Bernard
Kouchner's lamentable conclusion that Kosova has been "abandoned"
by the international community.
The political scene, despite the new power sharing arrangement, remains
fragmented with three main political forces vying for power:
Currently, Rugova's LDK is making a comeback with recent polls indicating
more support for Rugova than for Thaci. Internal problems and factions
remain however, but no direct challenger to Rugova has yet surfaced.
None of these political forces however, are well developed parties with
clear programs, though all favor a multi-party system and a market economy.
Disagreement also remains over the timing and sequence of elections, with
many arguing for simultaneous local and nation-wide elections. Nation-wide
elections are perceived as an important tool for filling in the continuing
institutional vacuum, giving Albanians a stake in the ruling process. There
is the danger however, that Albanians would view elections as a referendum
on independence.
While Kosovar politics continue to be fractious, almost without exception
all forces have welcomed the establishment of an international interim
administration. There is also widespread recognition among Albanians that
Kosova will remain an international protectorate for many years, though, at
the same time, there is complete unanimity that at the end of the interim
period, Kosova should become an independent state.
The UN Security Council resolution leaves Kosova's final status vague. In
one clause, the resolution reaffirms the "sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia" while in another clause, the resolution
pledges that the UN interim administration will facilitate "a political
process designed to determine Kosova's future status, taking into account
the Rambouillet Accords." The only clear fact seems to be that the
international community is interested in postponing indefinitely Kosova's
final status. There are indications however, that the international
community is finally coming around to the realization that Serbs and
Albanians in Kosova cannot coexist in the immediate future. This is visible
in the international community's recent rhetoric, advocating a change from
the initial push for a "multiethnic society" in Kosova to the
current, downgraded call for "peaceful coexistence"of the two
ethnic groups.
It is the opinion of this writer that only independence represents a viable
option, with the possibility of some border adjustments but no partition.
Serbia has forfeited its right to rule over Kosova despite its historical
claims. The self-determination of the Albanian people in Kosova must be
viewed as a higher good than support for state sovereignty. The option of
remaining within Serbia or Yugoslavia is simply unthinkable for the
overwhelming majority of the now radicalized ethnic Kosovar Albanians. Most
Albanians would like to see all Serbs leave Kosova.
The case of independence is clear even in legal constitutional terms -
Yugoslavia's breakup was interpreted by the international community as a
complete dissolution of a federal system. Kosova was a functioning federal
unit so Kosovar independence would be similar to that of other former
Yugoslav republics, involving only an "upgrading" of existing
state borders.
For its part, Albania is in the middle of a painful and prolonged
transition. The post- Berisha government has been unable to restore order
and revitalize the economy while crime and corruption have become a way of
life, discouraging foreign investment, diverting political energy and
generally distracting the government and the population from implementing
urgently needed reform tasks.
Yet, the war in Kosova provided an unprecedented opportunity for Albania to
improve its badly tarnished image. At the same time however, the ruling
socialist government of Prime Minister Ilir Meta used the Kosova war as a
justification for its lack of progress on necessary internal economic and
political reforms.
The largest opposition party - the Democratic Party (PD) - has never
accepted the 1997 election results which ushered the socialists to power.
Despite its own vague party platform, the Democratic Party has done
everything in its power to undermine the government, capitalizing on the
growing discontent and political fragmentation inside the socialist party.
The Kosova crisis was resolved too soon for Albania to reap significant
benefits such as the foreign assistance necessary for building its
dilapidated infrastructure. The public's focus has now returned to the
crises between the government and the opposition as well as to the crime and
corruption issues. The main problem is that the government lacks legitimacy
in the eyes of its people. Unless Meta's government can bring about
perceptible improvements in law and order, in the struggle against
corruption, and the revitalization of the economy, there is little future
for the ruling socialists.
Due to both the opposition's and the government's failure to coalesce and
present a viable strategy to lift the country out of the current political,
economic and social crisis, Albania will remain a flash point to be watched
closely over the next few years. Unfortunately, this "muddling through"
will cost Albania the loss of the historic window of opportunity offered by
the end of the war in Kosova and the Stability Pact.
Kosova however, was not and is not a salient issue in Albania's domestic
politics. While the Albanians see the protectorate as a significant step
toward resolving the Albanian issue, they are not pushing for the
unification of Kosova with Albania. Preoccupied by internal political and
corruption problems, Albania's goal is to have open borders and improve
communication and trade with Kosova. Currently, Albania is not in a position
to play the role of a spiritual and political mother country to Kosova. The
impetus for changing the status quo will come not from Albania but from the
diaspora.
For its part, Kosova will not look to Albania as the primary actor working
for unification. The separation has been too long, the respective economic,
political and social development too different to enable the merging of the
two regions in the short term. Despite the war, Kosovar Albanians seem to
have a higher level of political and social development than their Albanian
brothers. Consequently, Kosovar attitudes are focusing inward, on the
revival of their own society, on the rebuilding of institutions.
While the war in Kosova did reawaken the dream of Albanian reunification,
Kosova's unification with Albania does not appear to be a realistic option
in the short term. There is however, a gradual movement in terms of
education, economy and politics towards eventual unification. This gradual
change should be embraced rather than feared, as long as it is effected
gradually and under international law. Unification in this fashion would
represent a permanent solution to the Albanian question and would be
consistent with the principle of self- determination and the past creation
of other European nation-states. Such a united Albania would not represent a
serious threat to any of its neighbors. It should therefore, not be opposed,
but rather managed to ensure that it is achieved peacefully and gradually.
Elez Biberaj spoke at an EES Noon Discussion on February 2, 2000
185. Burdens of the Past: Separation as Solution to Post-War
Kosovo
Author: Michael Shafir, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Senior Regional Specialist
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The war in Kosovo internationalized the dilemma of democracy - how to
treat non-democratic forces that act against democratic premises. Or, how
tolerant can one be against intolerance?
By choosing to get directly involved in Kosovo, however, the international
community inherently questioned the very definition of national sovereignty.
This infringement of national sovereignty was justified in the case of
Kosovo by the premise of action in defense of human rights.
As Michael Shafir points out, the aim of the war however, was never clearly
defined before NATO planes struck Yugoslavia. This aim evolved with the
unfolding of the air campaign. "If the aim of the Kosovo war was to
terminate the Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic's reign of power,"
Shafir asserts, "then the war was a failure."
The aim of the war, Michael Shafir asserts, should have been to support the
national forces in Serbia that can undertake democratic reform from within.
Instead, the war only deepened already existing divisions within the Serbian
opposition and contributed to the long term isolation of the entire Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. As Shafir points out, this long term isolation will
have severe implications and a lasting impact on the short- and long-term
policies of Serbia, Kosovo, and the rest of the region as well as the
Western NATO alliance.
Implications for Serbia
War radicalizes society. Yet, Shafir indicates, the Serbian population was
already radicalized by the sharp divide between the "haves" and
the "have nots." Nearly 9/10th of the population lives in extreme
poverty. Poverty induces a need to ignore formal rules, encouraging
informality and illegality which are in direct opposition to democracy and
rule of law. Furthermore, illegality induces violence, distrust and the need
to get things done through personal or tribal ties.
In Yugoslavia, these tribal ties are deeply entangled with ethnicity.
According to Shafir, Slobodan Milosevic capitalized on and exacerbated this
intermingling of tribalism and ethnicity to consolidate power and play up
national myths. The current war has only served to strengthen
ethnicity-based tribalism, reducing law and trust to the issue of personal
ties.
National forces in Serbia consequently, push not toward democracy but toward
a form of socialist egalitarianism and a tribalism rooted in ethnicity.
According to Shafir, this drive towards egalitarianism is prevalent
throughout the rest of Eastern Europe as well, impeding the overall region's
rapid transformation to democracy. As tribalism is exported in the region,
factors of informality, illegality and organized crime go hand in hand,
further destabilizing the region and adding to the already existing economic
division of society.
In addition to the reinforcement of tribalism, the destruction and the
unclear results of the Kosovo war, also imparts a sense of uncertainty,
futility, frustration and an overall feeling of victimization. Furthermore,
as Shafir attests, it reinforces popular Serb myths of "them against
us."
Yet, Michael Shafir states that the NATO air war against Yugoslavia was not
necessarily wrong. The problem lies in dealing with a regime which has
repeatedly gone back on its word. Even if Milosevic was removed, the burden
of the past cannot be ignored. In this context, would a strong Serbian state
benefit Western interests? Shafir points out that a relatively strong
Serbian state is responsible for the current decade of devastation in
Southeast Europe. Would then, a weak Serbian state be the answer to regional
stability? Shafir objects, emphasizing the urgent need for change in the
region and the lack of ability of a weak state to undertake even internal
reforms. It becomes apparent that a hybrid mixture of both kinds of states,
with strong international supervision, is needed to usher in even a modicum
of democracy and stability in war-torn Serbia.
Implications for Kosovo
According to Shafir, the province of Kosovo has suffered a long tradition of
harassment due to: foreign occupation, hostile military forces, and most
recently, deprivation of its former autonomy within Yugoslavia. Had the West
intervened at an earlier date or applied more pressure to both Serbian and
Albanian sides, Shafir asserts, perhaps a man like Ibrahim Rugova advocating
a peaceful solution could have stood a chance. Now, all sides have been
radicalized, with Rugova politically dead and the Kosovo Liberation Army
(UCK) agitating for an independent Kosovo. According to Shafir, the delayed
reaction of the West and the bombing campaign had the effect of supporting
and legitimizing the UCK claim, unleashing an Albanian crusade for
retribution and revenge against the Kosovo Serb minority despite initial
Western hopes and intentions for a multi-ethnic Kosovo.
This scenario places the opposition to Milosevic in Serbia in a difficult
position. As Shafir emphasized, not only is the Serbian opposition not ready
to acquiesce in Kosovo's independence but it views the defense of the
Serbian minority, now placed in a parallel situation to the Kosovar
Albanians before the West intervened, as its responsibility.
According to Shafir, an independent Kosovo is dangerous because it's
inevitable UCK-run government would have no tolerance for ethnic minorities
and little or no experience with true democratic principles of transparency
and a rule of law. In addition, an independent Kosovo would not bode well
for either Bosnia or Macedonia. As Shafir attests, a partitioned Kosovo is
also not a good option, bringing into question under whose authority such a
protectorate might evolve as well as further fanning the rhetorical flames
of extreme radicals like Hungary's Istvan Csurka over Vojvodina, Serbia's
other formerly autonomous region.
Shafir also stressed the importance of Western presence and direct
involvement in the development of a democratic Kosovo. "Without a
Western presence, Kosovo will be an unstable state relying on basic tenets
of tribalism and filial ties - a state where there are no formal democratic
institutions of governance."
Implications for the Region and Russia
According to Shafir, Orthodox ties rallied public opinion in countries like
Romania and Greece to oppose the NATO bombing campaign. In both cases,
however, the official government line was unquestionable support of NATO.
Meanwhile, with the West's intervention and involvement in Kosovo, the
region's former dominating power, Russia, was pushed into "semi-irrelevance."
Tellingly, the Baltic states took definite pro-NATO positions while their
Russian minorities were staunchingly anti-NATO.
The biggest paradox came from NATO's new members - the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary who either opposed the NATO bombing or were caught in the
middle between NATO obligations and old regional ties. According to Shafir,
overall the war only served to demonstrate European powerlessness in the
Balkans.
Against this background, Shafir posed the question, is the idea of a greater
Albania, into which the West has unwittingly slipped, a positive one? He
resolutely opposes this notion, labeling it "not conducive to democracy"
and a negative example for the region's other, dormant, radical separatist
movements.
A greater Albania would also toughen the Russian position towards Chechnya
and other internal separatist movements, as well as create insecurity in the
rest of the region, especially for neighboring countries like Macedonia,
Turkey and Greece.
Furthermore, a greater Albania presupposes an easy relationship between the
Kosovar Albanians and those of Albania proper. As Shafir points out however,
this is far from true - the Kosovo Albanians have had a higher standard of
living and cultural development than their neighbors in Albania, implying an
unequal hierarchy between the two.
Implications for the West
Shafir dismissed the popular conception that Western economic reconstruction
assistance will solve the problems of the region. The problem should be
viewed rather, as one rooted in socio-cultural traditions and "burdens
of the past." If democratizing Serbia is the aim, the ultimate goal
should be, Shafir attests, a state properly run, based on transparency,
predictability and accountability -- all elements which need to first take
root on local soil. The West also needs to take into account the lack of
trust between estranged minorities and ethnic groups - a problem which could
take generations to overcome.
Within this context, Shafir emphasizes the need for acceptance within Kosovo
of a temporary yet formal zone of separation between the Serbs and Albanians.
He prescribes this form of separate cohabitation within Kosovo, together
with the recognition of the need for long-term Western involvement in the
region, as the only solutions for lasting peace in Kosovo and the Balkans as
a whole.
On September 28, Michael Shafir, addressed the post-Kosovo Southeastern
Europe region and prescribed ethnic separation and prolonged Western
involvement as the only possible solution for Kosovo.
|
Southeastern Europe has challenged the future of Europe and North America.
While some of the region's intractable disputes simmer (e.g., between Greece and
Turkey), the events, policies and personalities that inflamed the Balkans since
1989 have endangered principles for which advanced democracies stand and the
alliance that unites them in common defense. If and how we pre-empt, halt and
un-do heinous measures by nationalists and extremists in the Balkans will
largely determine how the Euro-Atlantic community enters the 21s century.
The July 30, 1999 declaration of a "Balkan Stability Pact" (the BSP)
at a 30-state Sarajevo summit conference is, thus far, the West's principal,
long-term response to the wars in former Yugoslavia. In the short-run, American
bombs and missiles forced Serbs to evacuate Kosovo. The BSP however, begins to
define how the West may seek to avoid another decade like the 1990s, suggesting
a kind of de facto model not only for the Balkans but wherever peoples and
borders intermingle.
Sarajevo bookends this century. Eighty-five years ago, a global war began there
with the assassination of Austrian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand; this summer, the
Sarajevo summit tried again to extinguish remnants of this modern "one
hundred years war." The Archduke was, no doubt, still watching.
Bosnia and Kosovo shook Western leaders out of their self-delusion that
post-Cold War Europe would be whole, free, and peaceful. We're not there yet. We
may never be.
Further, a vague trans-Atlantic consensus painfully emerged - that responding to
violent crises belatedly, and trying to enforce peace through intervention, have
severe political, economic and moral costs for the West.
A formula for conflict prevention, however, was still needed. Western Europe,
with Germany in the lead, championed the notion of a "stability pact"
for the Balkans. A draft was first aired during early April, 1999, just a couple
of weeks after bombing had commenced. Then, given the EU and G-8 imprimatur in
June, the Balkan Stability Pact took form as an instrument aimed at preventing
and handling long-term and regional conditions that generate tensions or
conflict. Such a pact has the aura of a regional Marshall Plan, and a potential
price tag of $30 billion over five years according to EU estimates.
But, the Stability Pact is not what we or the Balkans needed. It is diplomatic
prozac at a time when shock therapy is required. It offers inducements and
rewards before the heavy lifting. It suggests that we can buy and educate the
Balkans towards market democracy in the long term, before a secure milieu exists
in which to nurture such fragile institutions.
To the educated and sophisticated citizens of Southeastern Europe, the BSP is a
bitter joke - another case of bait and switch, false promises, and dashed hopes.
Interviews throughout the region during mid to late summer 1999 found no one who
could muster more than moderate "interest" in the BSP's prospects.
Most elites pointed out that initial financial commitments to support the
Stability Pact were far greater than the follow-up transfer of resources; the
United States, for example, brought to the Sarajevo conference no more than $500
million in commitments, most of which was left over monies from a supplemental
allocation meant to fund Kosovo peacekeeping operations.
The Balkan Stability Pact is neither Balkan, stable nor a pact. Its genesis lies
in Western, great-power interests and EU monies; it ignores the real basis for
stability, which is security, and it is based solely on political commitment not
treaty law and ratification. Most important, in a threat-rich, capacity-poor
environment such as the Balkans, stability is vacuous unless sources of
insecurity are eliminated.
The Stability Pact does nothing to address the immediate and urgent sources of
insecurity that will undermine the accord's credibility. First, those who
started this war as well as earlier post-Yugoslav wars rest comfortably in
Belgrade. Slobodan Milo evi may be most recognizable, but six Serb leaders were
indicted by the Hague Tribunal, and many other investigations are underway.
Meanwhile, their army and police are intact, their money safely stashed, and no
amount of bounty placed on their heads will enable even the remote possibility
for their capture and arrest within Serbia.
As long as these people are in power in Belgrade, Serbia remains an outcast. As
such, it will be excluded from most assistance packages, thereby ensuring that
such packages will be less effective. A proactive, KFOR-led (and SFOR in Bosnia)
program to apprehend those indicted for war crimes is essential ; without such
an effort, a critical component of lasting security - internal and external
confidence that justice will triumph - is absent.
Second, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) is far from disarmed, and the kind of
vigilante retribution first seen in Gracko will continue to recur. The KLA's
mafia-like connections to shadowy financiers, arms traffickers and the global
drug trade bode ill for any thought of handing Kosovo's governance over to
"democrats." That Hasim Thaqi and other KLA leaders have less public
support today than when KFOR entered Kosovo is small comfort. Without a robust
effort to seize and destroy arms that incorporates all combatants, and strenuous
sub-regional arms control, there is no chance for superficial stability to take
root in the Balkans.
Third, beyond Kosovo, the Balkan Stability Pact is built on the shifting sand of
a region that includes collapsed states, nationalist authoritarianism, and shaky
coalitional governments with miserable economic records. In the 1990s, several
varieties of Balkan political "systems" have emerged. Weak states such
as Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia encompass governmental institutions
which exist and act but have so little efficacy that the provision of public
goods is questionable. The state is consequently being supplanted by criminal
organizations, ethnic or tribal groups, or other alternatives. Apart from weak
states, pseudo- states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina exist at the behest of larger,
wealthier, protective powers, while failed-states such as Albania long ago
ceased to have much meaning in terms of political or economic behavior.
With respect to their degree of integration into Western institutions, the
Balkans are not on the fast track; a few countries are tenuously moving on a
slow track, while others are derailed and some have yet to leave the station.
Fourth, as others have also noted, the Stability Pact is primarily an EU
"show". After providing the lion's share of military muscle to force
Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, Washington is in the backseat. Given Europe's
Balkan track record, the Pact's efficacy or longevity will suffer by such an
imbalance between war-making and peacekeeping or reconstruction.
Stability for Southeastern Europe without first ensuring security is perilous.
The German design implies a Balkan peninsula made docile through economic
infusion, intertwined by trade, and increasingly dependent on the EU. But, as
long as it is a region populated by failed states, weak political institutions,
and extremist public personalities, docility will quickly usher in demagogues
ready to attack democratic and market reforms as sell-outs to foreign interests.
With the Balkan Stability Pact, we and our allies seek to hold in check, dampen,
and minimize political dynamics in a volatile region. Europe, and to a lesser
extent the US, will throw money at the problem and hope that long-term
palliatives constrain the chance for violent upheaval or further ethnic conflict
while encouraging democratic behavior.
Yet stability isn't democracy. Ongoing, grinding poverty is a stability of
sorts, along the lines of Todor Zhivkov's four decades in Bulgaria. When
yesterday, today and tomorrow are indistinguishable, you've discovered stability.
But it is also numbing and the antithesis of plural, tolerant societies or
entrepreneurial capitalism.
The peoples and countries of the Balkans may, indeed, need substantial
instability before they can find security- instability to rid themselves of war
criminal presidents or aging nationalist presidents; instability to leap towards
real market economies without heavy state intervention; instability during a
concerted attack against organized crime; and, instability as society is forced
by law to eliminate ethnic biases.
Change wrought via elections can destabilize for awhile, but such votes are the
only path by which to ensure lasting, effective political shifts. Opponents of
democracy should know that it is to their peril were they to stand in the way of
implementing electoral outcomes. Accelerating and broadening economic
transformations can be substantially destabilizing too, as the catharsis of
economic contraction takes place before revitalization - for which the US and
our NATO allies should be prepared with tangible assistance to strengthen the
"social safety net." Serious attacks on organized crime likewise may
provoke counterattacks and terrorism, against which American and European
interests are obvious.
A Balkan Stability Pact that seeks to pump billions of Euros and dollars into
Southeastern European infrastructure projects, or deposits additional thousands
of NGO civil society-builders, may relieve the West of accumulated guilt for
watching as genocidal plans were made and implemented. But, such measures will
not ensure social, economic or political stability. The path towards market
democracy and peaceful behavior must be first cleared of attitudinal and
institutional obstacles. For such an endeavor, the Stability Pact's "silent"
raison d'etre - to improve conditions within the Balkans so that peoples of that
region stay home and eschew mass violence - misses the mark.
The Archduke may want to warn someone.
Daniel N. Nelson spoke at an EES Noon Discussion on October 20, 1999
The U.S. Congress is often an easy target for criticism, especially in
foreign policy. This happened frequently during the 1990s, as Congress involved
itself in the Yugoslav conflict and the U.S. response to it.
It is a well-known fact that some Members of Congress are motivated by a strong
sense of partisanship; others are influenced by one ethnic constituency or
another. Some have an instinct to support an underdog and hence favor the
self-determination of a victimized people. Others view the abuse of
self-determination by self-proclaimed representatives of people as the quicksand
into which we too easily wade. Still others have strong links to the human
rights and humanitarian assistance community, while their colleagues have
equally strong links with those in the military or elsewhere who view narrowly
defined interests and not broad moral questions as the determinants of policy.
These latter also advocate strict criteria for U.S. engagement. Some have no
particular interest in the Balkans or even foreign affairs at all, and may
potentially tie their support or opposition regarding U.S. Balkans policy to
issues of greater concern to them. This latter group is usually the majority.
Through all of the clashing motivations, intelligence and seriousness are both
more widespread on the Hill than is often thought, and the action taken, more
often than not, reflects a collective wisdom about what is the right thing for
the United States to do.
The reality, of course, is that no parliamentary body, not even one with the
powers and bureaucratic support of the U.S. Congress, can actually take the lead
in foreign policy formulation. Foreign policy leadership must reside in the
domain of the executive. That said, the bureaucracy of a Department or agency
can easily lose touch with the reality that it exists in a democratic country. A
foreign policy elite can formulate responses which the average American would
not support, and the failure to understand a particular policy may not be the
fault of the simple-minded citizen but of the convoluted and contradictory
policy itself. Regarding Southeastern Europe, I was amazed at how some
incredibly respectable minds in the field of foreign affairs could explain away
the carnage in some fatalistic way when we had the means, interest and, perhaps,
the obligation to stop it.
This is where, I believe, Congress did play a large role in developing a U.S.
policy response to Yugoslavia's violent demise, not by formulating any coherent
policy of its own but in getting the first Bush administration, and then the
Clinton administration, to move toward starting a coherent policy. Unfortunately,
it took a long time. It responded to what was a failed U.S. policy of
non-engagement in the early 1990s, a policy which was based not so much on
reality on the ground, but instead on some of the very myths being spewed forth
by Balkan propaganda machines.
Generally, the Congress did press for the United States to become much more
engaged than it had been, but, over time, it also set some limits on that
engagement. I would only specifically mention, in light of recent news reports
of Clinton-Milosevic telephone conversations, the role Congress played in
questioning U.S. reliance on Milosevic for Dayton implementation, to the
detriment of Serbian democracy, and turning that situation around.
Of course, one may disagree with one or more - maybe most - of the policy
options, and certainly some Members of Congress did. I would argue, however,
that Congress was fairly correct and consistent in its views. The Congress
certainly seemed to have a better handle on what the United States, as a
superpower, had some obligation to do, as well as on the threat conflict posed,
not only for the region through spillover potential, but to the NATO alliance
struggling for a post-Cold War purpose.
The Congress has, in the past two years, become less active on the Balkan front,
quieting down even while the conflict in Macedonia was heating up. The events of
September 11 reinforced but did not start this trend.
First, a sense of "Balkan fatigue" was setting in, even among those
who were among the strongest proponents of U.S. engagement. There was a general
admission that such engagement was a very, very expensive undertaking, mostly
because real engagement had been undertaken so late that much of what was worth
defending in lives and in ideals was already at least partially lost. The
compromises made at Dayton are symbolic of this sense of loss, and this
phenomenon can be traced back almost to that time. On the other hand, those who
had argued against such engagement had ensured by calling for U.S. troops to
withdraw from the region that the Clinton administration alone would be
responsible for anything that would happen to them while they were deployed in
the region. (Indeed, I sense that these same Members did not actually want to
take the responsibility themselves for what might have happened had they
succeeded in pulling our forces out of the Balkans and might not have taken the
initiative had the chances of success been greater.) Added to all of this is the
frustration caused by corruption, organized crime and bad governance.
Second, Milosevic was effectively removed from the scene in 2000, not to mention
Tudjman in Croatia almost a year earlier. I think people recognized that not
everything would return to normal once nationalist leaders are cast aside; there
are still the legacies of their policies as well as the underlying problems
which allowed them to come to power in the first place. In this sense, southern
Serbia and, especially Macedonia, were wake-up calls in 2001. Still, it is
undeniable that, especially with Milosevic gone, a major threat to long-term
stability in the region has disappeared as well.
Third, the United States also got a new President. Rightly or wrongly, President
Clinton had undeniably become a controversial figure, subject to partisan
attacks and defense. Any new President will get a "honeymoon" period,
but this one more so than most. While some expressed concern about withdrawing
from the Balkans, potential fires were quickly doused with the "In Together,
Out Together" approach espoused by Secretary of State Colin Powell. As
Macedonia has shown, the Bush administration would draw some lines on additional
commitments of forces, but it would also maintain existing commitments. By and
large, the Macedonian situation was sufficiently messy to keep the Congress from
questioning that position.
Finally, I sense that the American military establishment, had developed over
the past 5 years some degree of comfort with its duties in Southeastern Europe
that it originally did not have. Perhaps the comfort level is not the same as
satisfaction, and a withdrawal would still be preferred, but the military may
also have come to find this presence and duty useful in a strategic or military
sense, as well as in terms of garnering sympathy and support on the Hill,
including for its budget. Similarly, the military has had a more comfortable
start with this Administration than with its predecessor, despite some policy
disputes last summer. Many Members of Congress criticized President Clinton for
his perceived misuse of our armed forces. Our military's apparent comfort level
in the Balkans as well as with the current administration have led Congress to
be quieter on this issue.
September 11, of course, sealed the fate of Southeastern Europe as an area of
less priority for the United States. As has been noted, President Bush's State
of the Union Address had more foreign policy content than any since the Vietnam
period, and perhaps since World War II, yet there was no mention at all of
Southeastern Europe, a region which had been a foreign policy priority just a
year or two before, except for Bosnia's release to U.S. forces of six Algerians.
Secretary of State Powell's statement before the Congress, presenting the FY '03
budget request for foreign affairs, only made brief mention of the region, and
then, partly in terms of its value as an area for joint efforts with our friends
and allies. Even if this downplaying is a mistake, which to an extent it is, few
in the Congress would seriously question this sudden change in the current
environment. The reality is that, while Southeastern Europe has not been
abandoned, heads have turned to face a new threat to stability, more global in
scope and more clearly linked to U.S. interests.
Having said that, there are at least six areas where the Congress may express
its views on current U.S. policy toward the Balkans. This list is neither
exhaustive, nor presented in any particular order.
At the beginning of this new century we may ask what problems we inherited,
unresolved, from the last century. One of those problems is the Balkans.
No other region caused such grief to so many foreign empires in the 20th
century. The Ottoman Empire declined and fell there in 1912. The
Austro-Hungarian Empire started World War I over an assassination in Sarajevo
and collapsed in 1918. The Italian empire of Mussolini and the Third Reich of
Hitler invaded and occupied but never completely subdued the Balkans. The
first setback to Stalin's Soviet empire was the successful breakout of Tito's
Yugoslavia in 1948.
The Balkan peninsula was long a tempting playground for foreign forces, but
they usually transformed it into a wasteland of grinding destruction and
bloodshed. There was an inward effect as well. Dividing Balkan nations either
into vassals or implacable enemies, the empires prevented the indigenous
peoples from developing normal relations with each other. Further, they were
discouraged from developing their own political life beyond the stage of
satrapies or petty despotisms.
In 1991, as Yugoslavia - free of foreign domination for scarcely 40 years -
plunged into dissolution amid fierce ethnic fighting, Deputy Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger said repeatedly it might be best to leave the
various factions to fight it out until they couldn't fight any more, and then
they would go to the negotiating table. "I am personally of the view that
the only thing that may bring it to an end,"' he said, "is when all
of the participants are exhausted."
As cold-blooded as this approach might have seemed, how many thousands of
lives might have been spared, how many people might have been able to remain
in their homes instead of joining desperate refugee treks? I am not suggesting
that the outcomes of the various conflicts would have been benign in such a
scenario, just a good deal shorter, less bloody and less destructive.
Where is the error of the approach taken by the United States and its European
allies to the problem of Yugoslavia, throughout the 1990s? I think that it
lies in their belief that they could succeed where others failed and then, to
choose sides narrowly in what inevitably became a series of civil wars: here
uniformly innocent victims, there uniformly genocidal aggressors; here ethnic
cleansers, there the ethnically cleansed.
Did it not register with the strategists in Washington, London or Bonn that in
World War II, Croats "cleansed" far more Serbs than Serbs "cleansed"
Croats; if one can call extermination of tens of thousands in the Jasenovac
death camp "cleansing?" Or, that Albanians, with the backing of
Ottoman Turks, followed by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany pushed far more
Serbs out of Kosovo than vice versa.
The population figures before the NATO bombing campaign make simple testimony:
80 percent Albanian and 20 percent non-Albanian. At the root lies a simplistic
dogma that blames one nation, the Serbs, as the origin of evil in the Balkans.
It is an unwritten doctrine adopted by the State Department at the beginning
of the Yugoslav conflicts and continued today, a doctrine endorsed and spread
by the mainstream media, human rights groups and even some religious
communities. It is a doctrine also embraced by Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the head
of the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, who declared unabashedly before Albanians in
Gnjilane last December that "Kosovo does not belong to anyone except the
Kosovars." He further added: "I feel very close to the Albanian
people... I love all peoples but some more than others and that is the case
with you."
The indisputable reality of the Balkans is that none of its peoples have been
an altogether innocent victim of vicious neighbors. Except possibly the Roma.
All were complicit at one time or another in killing, rape, plunder and
burning. And this was true in the first and second Balkan war, true in both
World Wars and true in all of the Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s.
Yes, more than 300,000 Croats were displaced during combat with Serbs in 1991.
But more than 300,000 Croatian Serbs became refugees as a result of the
American-fostered Croatian offensives of 1995 in the Krajina region.
Yes, more than one million Bosnian Muslims were driven from their homes by
Serb and Croat offensives. Few have been able to return. But 400,000 Bosnian
Serbs and tens of thousands of Bosnian Croats were also forced into exile by
the Muslims.
Yes, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo in the spring of
1999. Yet, there is a curiosity documented by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from the 78-day bombing campaign in terms of
"cleansing" - the OSCE found that 863,000 Albanians left Kosovo,
roughly 46 percent of the total. But it also reported that 100,000 Serbs and
Montenegrins fled Kosovo in the same period, this constituting about 60
percent of the total. Proportionately, more Serbs were displaced during the
bombing, and they - unlike the Albanians whose majority returned despite
rampant destruction of their homes - did not return to Kosovo. A new exodus
then commenced, as the unleashed fury of the Albanians wreaked hideous
vengeance on Serbs, Roma and even ethnic Turks - shooting, knifing, strangling,
grenading, shelling, burning - killing more than 1,000 people. This happened
and continues to happen under the eyes of the 37,000 soldiers of the KFOR
occupation force deployed by NATO.
Against this background of intimidation and threat it is estimated that
250,000 non-Albanians have fled Kosovo since the NATO bombing ceased. I am
persuaded that much of this could have been avoided. Retracing NATO's steps in
June, the inundation of arms in Kosovo could have been largely prevented
rather early by sealing Kosovo's borders to Albania and Macedonia and then
filtering the returning Albanian refugees to ensure that the KLA was not
bringing weapons back to the region. Instead, NATO settled for a voluntary and
totally ineffective disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army last summer.
Attacks on Serbs and others have not diminished since then, while Kosovo's
Albanians remain armed to teeth.
Incidentally, it was reported in February that some 200,000 people have moved
since the summer from Albania to Kosovo, which despite the destruction caused
by Serbs and NATO bombing is still better off than the ancestral lands to the
south.
Going back to the days before the bombing, I believe that if the United States
and its allies had taken a calmer view of the situation, much death and
destruction could have been avoided. Possibly even the seemingly endless cycle
of ethnic revenge could have been halted.
A year ago after a difficult start, the American-inspired Kosovo Diplomatic
Observer Mission (KDOM) numbering more than 1,000 personnel was beginning to
get traction, separating the Serbian military and police forces from the
Kosovo Liberation Army and enabling thousands of displaced Albanians to return
to their homes. The final report to OSCE by a German general who was part of
KDOM confirms this.
In its hubris, however, the Clinton Administration sought more dramatic
results - amounting to abject submission of the Serbs to NATO rule. This was
the message of Rambouillet. Had the observer mission been allowed to continue
I think Kosovo would have been a much gentler, happier place today.
Perhaps someday we will discover whether the White House chose, as some
suspect, a Kosovo scenario as a deliberate shift of focus away from the
domestic turmoil caused by the impeachment. Perhaps we will learn how much
importance the Kosovo operations, and Bosnia before it, had in Administration
plans to turn NATO into an instrument of American foreign policy, and to
assert American primacy in Europe. Perhaps an explanation will come to light
about how Washington could list the Kosovo Liberation Army among the world's
terrorist organizations in 1997, could denounce it as a "terrorist
group" in February 1998, and then turn around 180 degrees overnight and
embrace it as a formation of freedom fighters, installing it as a legitimate
political force in the summer of 1999. This sudden shift occurred despite
disclosures of links between the KLA and Albanian heroin trafficking rings in
Italy, Switzerland, Germany and other European countries, and the connection
of the KLA leader, Hashim Thaci, to assassinations of Albanian rivals. Perhaps
the Administration could one day also dispel the mystery of why United Nations
Police could be ordered last January to cease surveillance of the Thaci family
after his brother was charged with illegal possession of weapons and of
$791,000 in cash and then released.
Even without light being shed on those behind-the-scene developments I believe
that the 11 billion dollar military campaign against the Serbs and for the
Albanians was largely a failure. And it was a failure for the following
reasons:
In the 21st century, organized crime in the Balkans has accomplished what
empires like the Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, Hapsburgs and, briefly,
Hitler’s Third Reich achieved in centuries past. Namely, to compel the
myriad, rival ethnic groups of the region to work together for a common
purpose. The difference, of course, is in the compulsions and incentives. Past
empires used limited doses of advantages for those who cooperated, combined
with brute force against those who resisted.
The empire of organized criminals employs a more contemporary incentive –
the profit motive – for enterprises such as smuggling and selling narcotics,
trafficking women for sex, and moving contraband goods across frontiers. To be
sure, compulsion is also employed, whether it be various grades of blackmail,
or even murder.
This is not to say that organized crime is an exclusive Balkan specialty, like
Shopska salad. Rather, in these times of widespread poverty, of physical and
social ruins left by a series of civil wars and weak central governments, the
criminal empire has risen to become the largest industry in the region. It is
regulated not by traditional power structures, but by multiethnic networks of
bosses, transporters, dealers, and enforcers. Its tools are cell-phones, big
trucks, vans, buses, fast cars, and boats. The grease for its machinery
consists of bribes. Organized crime depends on willing partners in the police,
customs, border guards, judiciary and, ultimately, the political class.
Historically, there has always been smuggling and banditry in the Balkans,
often celebrated in song and legend, as in the tales of the Hajduks, or
brigands. Hajduks were not automatically considered anti-social, especially by
ordinary people. Banditry survived even in the days of Communist rule.
Narcotics trafficking from the poppy fields of Afghanistan through
Southeastern Europe flourished then, under mainly Turkish entrepreneurs. With
the fall of the Communist regimes in 1989, and with it, the fall of strong
border defenses and controls as well as the virtual collapse of police forces
and even of any central authority, the entire region opened up to the forces
of lawlessness. Indeed, criminal organizations coopted not only political but
also law enforcement officials. They were abetted by the simultaneous collapse
of Balkan economies, the crumbling of industrial enterprises, consequent
massive unemployment, and the creation of a class of desperate men and women.
All of these factors fed into the burgeoning underworld. Its activities were
greatly enhanced by the outbreak of the civil wars that brought about the fall
of Yugoslavia – the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the spillover
to Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, the breakdown of authority in Albania in 1997,
the outbreak thereafter of combat in Kosovo, followed by ethnic Albanian
insurrections in southern Serbia and Macedonia. All contributed to the anarchy
in which organized crime flourished.
Adding to the advantage of the criminal elements was the fact that law
enforcement authorities, even if they wanted to combat the new cross-border
trafficking, were woefully short of modern techniques and technology,
including sniffer dogs, x-ray devices and, in the case of Albania as recently
as 2001, of flashlights and handcuffs.
Within a short time, the West – the Swiss, the Italians, the French, the
Germans and, lately, the English – began taking notice that the Balkan
criminal activities were impinging on established Western European societies.
All of these Western European nations, but also the Slovaks, the Czechs and
the Dutch, published law enforcement estimates arguing that between 40 and 90
percent of the narcotics traffic was dominated by mainly Albanian gangs.
Interpol followed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also raised
warning flags about the rise of Albanian gangs trafficking heroin, sex slaves,
contraband, and large quantities of arms (although not only Albanians were
involved in these activities).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and various member
countries of the European Union have recently energized their efforts to
search for ways to combat organized crime indigenous to, and emanating from,
the Balkans.
The press and television have also taken notice. Books about organized crime
have started appearing – for instance – Drugs, the Empire of Evil
in 2000, by Marko Nicovic, and Human Traffic in the Balkans by Jelena
Bjelica, in 2002. Jeffrey Smith of the Washington Post is also writing
one, and presumably others are in the works. Academic scholars have so far
given very little attention to the subject.
For the most part, published accounts of organized crime, however thorough and
reputable, have tended to be brief and limited to one kind of criminal
undertaking – such as the narcotics trade or the sex trade, or even a single
crime case – rather than the subject as a whole. Thus, in December, one
could read three lines on a seizure of 44 kilos of heroin from two Bulgarians
at a Yugoslav frontier crossing. The haul was valued at over $2 million, but
there was no follow-up in the reporting. Or another short item, stating that
Bulgaria had lost $30 billion in revenue over a period of ten years due to
smuggling, principally contraband cigarettes and oil. Or, a four-line item
noting that Serbia had found and freed 48 victims of sex trafficking in the
year 2002. Again, no follow-up on the identity of the traffickers. This
treatment has tended to minimize the scope of the organized crime phenomena in
the public eye.
In the United States, Congress has held hearings both on drug trafficking and
on sex traffic in the Balkans. For several years, the State Department has
been issuing annual reports on human trafficking worldwide and, specifically,
in the Balkans, together with behavior ratings ranging from “tier one” for
relatively good, to “tier three” for bad. These ratings have implications
for American treatment of foreign governments in terms of granting economic
assistance and other forms of bilateral cooperation.
Since the year 2000, United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies
have become increasingly engaged in efforts to combat organized crime in the
Balkans. Previously, their overseas involvement was confined mainly to Latin
America and Asia. These agencies include the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Secret Service and even the National Security
Agency. Taken together, the United States has committed millions of dollars to
train, equip and back up regional law enforcement in the Balkans.
Why this attention? Why this alarm? A few facts and statistics: