RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 9, No. 95, Part II, 19 May 2005
U.S. ANNOUNCES PLAN FOR KOSOVA... U.S. Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns told the House Committee on
International Relations on 18 May that "President [George W.] Bush
and Secretary [of State Condoleezza] Rice place a high priority in
having the U.S. help to lead international efforts to stabilize the
Balkans," the State Department website reported
(http://www.state.gov/p/2005/46471.htm)
Burns noted that "2005 is a
year of decision for Kosovo. Together with the United Nations and our
European partners, we hope to launch a process to determine Kosovo's
future status." He stressed that "getting there will depend on
Kosovo's leaders continuing their progress on a set of UN-endorsed
standards that are designed to ensure the presence of basic values of
multiethnicity, democracy, and market-orientation while placing
Kosovo decisively on the path to future integration with Europe."
Burns acknowledged that "agreeing on a future status for Kosovo will
not be easy. Belgrade has set forth a position of 'more than
autonomy, but less than independence' for Kosovo. Kosovo's Albanian
population insists on immediate and unconditional independence.
Finding common ground between these positions will be a major
challenge, but we believe that with U.S. leadership and
trans-Atlantic cooperation, we can achieve a solution that produces
long term stability for the Balkans by moving the whole region into
the Euro-Atlantic family of nations" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 17
and
18 May, and "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 20 May 2005). PM
..OFFERING A PLAN OF ACTION... U.S. Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Burns said in Washington on 18 May that "the key
indicator of progress...will be the commitment of Kosovo's Albanians
to create a multiethnic Kosovo that fully includes Serbs, setting the
conditions for those who fled to return and live in safety," the
State Department's website reported. He added that "in recent months,
Kosovo Albanian leaders have taken positive steps in this area."
Burns called on the Albanian authorities to make progress on
decentralization, which is important to local Serbian communities,
and on the Serbs to "dismantle or integrate into Kosovo's
structures...the parallel, Belgrade-funded institutions, notably in
Mitrovica." He noted the importance of resolving economic problems
for the sake of overall stability, adding that "Kosovo's unresolved
status hampers not only the economy, but further progress on its core
goals." Burns stressed that Washington expects "the Contact Group --
consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the EU -- and the UN to meet this fall to consider
the results of the comprehensive review and to decide whether to
launch a political process to determine Kosovo's final status. If the
result of the review is sufficiently positive, the United States will
advocate a swift launch of status talks." PM
..INCLUDING BELGRADE'S ROLE... In his presentation on 18 May, U.S.
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Burns noted that any
final settlement in Kosova must include "effective mechanisms for
fighting organized crime and terrorism" and exclude any partition or
border changes, the State Department's website reported. He stressed
that "Belgrade's role in this process must be one of continued
constructive engagement. Any undue delay or obstruction would require
us to reevaluate Belgrade's role." He appealed to "Belgrade to
support Kosovo's Serbs taking their seats in the [Kosovo] Assembly
and resuming participation in Kosovo's institutions and political
life, ending their Belgrade-imposed isolation." Burns argued that
"Kosovo is a burden weighing Serbia down." He also reminded Serbian
leaders of the importance of full cooperation with the Hague-based
war crimes tribunal if they want integration into Euro-Atlantic
institutions. PM
..WITH THE BACKING OF THE UN. Soren Jessen-Petersen, who heads the
UN civilian administration in Kosova (UNMIK), told RFE/RL in New York
on 18 May that the new U.S. proposal on Kosova conveys "a very strong
message [to] the region, and that will be very helpful." He noted,
however, that "none of the so-called priority standards have been
entirely implemented, so there are some shortcomings.... [It will be
necessary] to work very hard over the next several months in
particular on promoting much bigger returns [of refugees and
internally displaced persons] and also improve freedom of movement in
areas where it's still a problem." Jessen-Peterson stressed the
importance of U.S. involvement in settling the Kosova issue, noting
that "if [the Americans] go in with clear messages, the Albanians
listen." PM
KOSOVA'S PRESIDENT AGREES TO MEET SERBIAN LEADER. Muhamet Hamiti, who
is Kosova's President Ibrahim Rugova's spokesman, said in Prishtina
on 18 May that Rugova is willing to meet Serbian President Boris
Tadic, perhaps in early June on the margins of an international
conference in Geneva, "in the presence of the heads of participating
Western states," Reuters reported (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 20
May
2005). The news agency noted that "the decision comes after a spell
of diplomatic arm-twisting, followed by political one-upmanship, as
presidents and prime ministers of both sides vie to meet on
politically the most favorable terms, if they have to meet at all."
PM
SERBIA'S PRESIDENT CALLS ON BALKAN LEADERS TO PUT WORLD WAR II BEHIND
THEM. Croatian President Stipe Mesic and his counterpart from Serbia
and Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic, agreed in a telephone conversation
on 18 May to work for an improvement in bilateral relations, RFE/RL's
South Slavic and Albanian Languages Service reported (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," 18 May 2005, and "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 22 April and
13
May 2005). The move follows Mesic's recent decision to cancel a
planned visit to Serbia because of a ceremony at Ravna Gora the
previous weekend honoring former Serbian royalist World War II
General Draza Mihailovic, who led the Chetnik movement. The Croatian
government on 18 May condemned in a statement what it called attempts
to rehabilitate the Chetniks. The statement added, however, that
Zagreb does not want to harm relations with the Belgrade authorities,
some of whom share Zagreb's view of the Chetniks. In the Serbian
capital, President Tadic said that many unnamed "Balkan politicians"
retain a mindset left over from World War II. Tadic stressed that
current relations in the region cannot be held hostage to issues left
over from that conflict, suggesting that he disagrees with Mesic's
decision to cancel his visit to Serbia. PM
MORE TALKS, MORE MODELS FOR KOSOVA
By Patrick Moore
New proposals and suggestions regarding Kosova's future have
emerged in recent weeks from several sources. The Kosovars continue
to want a quick transition to independence.
"The Washington Post" reported on 17 May that "the Bush
administration has decided on a new strategy designed to finally
settle whether Kosova will become fully independent of Serbia,
[unnamed] U.S. officials said." An unnamed "senior administration
official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity...[that] "if
you freeze the situation for two or more years, you are likely to
create a pressure cooker."
The Washington-based daily added that "the plan, which
Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns will announce in
congressional testimony [on 18 May] and a speech [the following day],
has been carefully worked out in intensive discussions with UN and
European officials. The United Nations will shortly appoint Kai Eide,
the Norwegian ambassador to NATO, to assess whether Kosova is ready
for final-status talks. Once that certification is made, probably by
mid-autumn, then the United Nations will sponsor international
negotiations on whether Kosova should remain part of Serbia, become
independent, or achieve a hybrid status."
Eide made a study on Kosova for UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in 2004, in which Eide called on the UN to move quickly on
giving the Kosovars a "road map" for the future. He stressed that
time was of the essence, but Annan proved more cautious. Eide's
report was, however, generally very well received by the Kosovars
themselves, who have long sought independence based on the principles
of self-determination and majority rule.
In recent weeks, much media attention has been given to
proposals by Serbian President Boris Tadic and several other Belgrade
leaders for unspecified "talks" with Kosova's elected ethnic Albanian
officials. Serbian leaders have, in fact, repeatedly called for
direct bilateral talks in Belgrade or Prishtina, whereas Kosovar
leaders want any conference on Kosova's future to be international in
scope and not in Belgrade. The Kosovar leaders are willing to talk
about "technical questions" with their Serbian counterparts but do
not want full-fledged political negotiations, arguing that Belgrade
lost all claims to the province by its behavior in the 1998-99
conflict.
Kosovar leaders also note that previous talks with Belgrade
have yielded no real results except to enable Serbia to claim that it
still plays a role in Kosovar affairs. In fact, Kosovar media note
that the Serbian leaders' main interest in the Kosova issue is
probably linked to domestic politics. General elections are widely
expected in Serbia before the end of 2005, and the Kosova question
enables the politicians to vie with each other for nationalist votes
and divert attention from Serbia's real problems, namely crime,
corruption, and poverty.
In private, many Serbian leaders concede that Belgrade has
lost Kosova and are at a loss for answers when asked what Serbia
would do if it ever found itself in charge of the province once
again. The UN has, in any event, made it clear that Serbia will not
have a veto over Kosova's future.
The EU, for one, nonetheless seems to have great hopes for
bilateral Belgrade-Prishtina talks. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli
Rehn said in Brussels on 20 April that Kosova's President Ibrahim
Rugova should take up Tadic's offer of talks. "It is very important
to start a constructive dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina,"
Rehn told reporters. He added that he has "noted positive
developments in this regard -- the willingness to [extend a] hand by
President Tadic, and I encourage President Rugova to take this
seriously and proceed to have a constructive dialogue." Rehn also
argued that "the [European] Commission will...help Kosova to make
progress towards its European aspirations, provided its political
leaders demonstrate a clear commitment to democratic principles,
human rights, rule of law, and economic reform."
An international commission recently suggested that the EU
extend explicit prospects of EU membership for an independent Kosova
that would, however, be an EU protectorate for at least several
years. Many Kosovars have come away from this and other discussions
with the impression that the EU is concerned as much with procedure
as with results, and that it is determined to somehow "prove" its
ability to deal with Balkan problems through prolonged paternalistic
rule regardless of what the locals might wish. Many people in the
Balkans sense that the attitude in Brussels is that if the "peoples
of the Western Balkans" want to join the EU, they will have to do as
they are told.
As RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian Languages Service has
noted, many Kosovars also suspect that the EU will ultimately try to
force Kosova into some form of joint state with Serbia and
Montenegro, which both Podgorica and Prishtina reject. These
perceptions of Brussels' intentions have led some Kosovars to
question how well such proposals have been thought through in light
of concrete experience. They argue that the track record of creative
Western statecraft in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro
has not been particularly encouraging.
In 1964, veteran British Middle East expert Anthony Nutting
criticized his country's policies in that region by noting that
"Britain failed to realize that the Arabs preferred being governed
badly by themselves to being governed well by somebody else" ("The
Arabs," New York: Mentor, p. 364). His observations are probably
still valid four decades later -- and in the Balkans as well.
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As Prepared for Delivery
Introduction President Bush and Secretary Rice place a high priority in having the U.S.
help to lead international efforts to stabilize the Balkans, ensure that the
evils of the 1990’s are not repeated, and bring the perpetrators of these
horrors to justice. We need to finish the work of ending the divisive strife
that has prevented the countries of the Balkans from advancing politically and
economically in line with their European neighbors. We and our Allies are
entering a new stage in our policy toward the Balkans, one that will accelerate
the region’s integration into the European family and Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Secretary Rice has asked me to travel to Serbia and Montenegro and
Kosovo, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina, early next month to reaffirm the U.S.
commitment to help resolve the problems of the region and urge local leaders to
make greater progress on outstanding issues.
To succeed in our overall efforts in the Balkans, we must work hard to help
the people of Kosovo find greater security, ethnic reconciliation and peace in
2005. Kosovo is perhaps the most difficult remaining issue in the region. We
believe, as the parties themselves do, that the status quo of Kosovo’s
undefined future is not sustainable or desirable. It satisfies no one and leaves
open the possibility of renewed ethnic violence. Failure to address Kosovo’s
status in the near term risks undoing much of what we have achieved in the
Balkans over the last ten years. Resolving Kosovo’s future status in a way
that also brings Serbia and Montenegro fully into the community of democratic
nations is an administration priority that will allow us to advance our goals
for the entire region, and put the legacy of the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia
firmly in the past.
2005 is a year of decision for Kosovo. Together with the United Nations and
our European partners, we hope to launch a process to determine Kosovo’s
future status. Getting there will depend on Kosovo’s leaders continuing their
progress on a set of UN-endorsed standards that are designed to ensure the
presence of basic values of multi-ethnicity, democracy, and market-orientation
while placing Kosovo decisively on the path to future integration with Europe.
No matter what Kosovo’s final status might be, these values are at the heart
of our effort to move the Balkans back onto the path of reform and progress that
most of the rest of the central and eastern European states have already so
successfully navigated since the end of the Cold War.
Agreeing on a future status for Kosovo will not be easy. Belgrade has set
forth a position of “more than autonomy, but less than independence” for
Kosovo. Kosovo’s Albanian population insists on immediate and unconditional
independence. Finding common ground between these positions will be a major
challenge, but we believe that with U.S. leadership and trans-Atlantic
cooperation, we can achieve a solution that produces long term stability for the
Balkans by moving the whole region into the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.
Current Situation Having been freed of Milosevic’s oppressive rule, in the aftermath of the
air campaign, sadly too many in Kosovo’s Albanian population decided to seek
their own retribution against their Serb neighbors. According to some estimates,
since 1999 over 100,000 Serbs and Roma have been driven from or fled their homes
in Kosovo. The United States and our NATO Allies made clear then, and continue
to reaffirm, that NATO did not go to war to save the Albanians from ethnic
cleansing only to see them mete out the same fate to the Serbs. Failure to
secure a multi-ethnic Kosovo would be a failure of our efforts over the last six
years and indeed, the last decade.
The UN and NATO remain committed to the tasks we assumed in 1999, under UN
Security Council Resolution 1244. Today, the very able and effective Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Soren Jessen-Petersen of Denmark
leads the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). An equally able retired American Foreign
Service Officer, Ambassador Larry Rossin, assists as his principal deputy. The
troops of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) have drawn down over time as the security
situation has improved. From a peak of 40,000 troops in late 1999, today KFOR
has around 18,000 troops on the ground, from 34 countries, who ensure a safe and
secure environment for all of Kosovo’s ethnic groups. From an original
deployment of nearly 15,000 U.S. troops, today roughly 1800 Americans serve as
an essential part of KFOR. President Bush has made clear that having gone in to
Kosovo with our Allies, we will stay there with them until the job is done. We
seek, of course, to hasten the day when peace is self-sustaining and our troops
can come home.
Until that day comes, we will continue to lead efforts to ensure that KFOR is
the most capable and effective force it can be. From my time at NATO, I well
know SACEUR General Jones’ commitment to this goal. We support General
Jones’ proposals to restructure KFOR to improve the tooth to tail ratio and
are urging Allies to focus on capabilities, not numbers, in assessing KFOR
strength.
Since 1999, Kosovo and the international community have made progress on
constructing the foundations of lasting stability. Kosovo has held four
successful elections, drafted a constitutional framework, established
provisional governmental institutions, and created a professional and
multi-ethnic police force. The UN has been able to hand over greater
responsibility for governance to the provisional government. Last October,
Kosovo held its second set of legislative elections, which were locally
administered. The elections were assessed as free and fair by the international
community, but were marred by the non-participation of Kosovo’s Serbs,
pressured by Belgrade not to join the democratic process. Following the
elections, a coalition government was formed with Ibrahim Rugova as President
and Ramush Haradinaj as Prime Minister. In its first 100 days, the Haradinaj
government achieved significant progress on implementing the UN-endorsed
standards.
In March, Ramush Haradinaj was indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for crimes allegedly committed while a
commander in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). He surrendered peacefully, and
voluntarily turned himself into the tribunal. The absence of violence and smooth
transition to a new government led by his replacement Prime Minister Bajram
Kosumi were encouraging signs of Kosovo’s growing political maturity. Since
March, Prime Minister Kosumi has worked to maintain much of his predecessor’s
momentum on standards implementation.
While this momentum was cause for optimism, the appalling violence of March
2004, which claimed 19 lives was deeply disturbing. Members of Kosovo’s
Albanian community largely targeted Kosovo's Serb community, demonstrating that
we remained far from our goal of a stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. The strong
international condemnation and demand for action was a wake up call to many of
Kosovo’s Albanian leaders that the international community was serious about
ensuring multi-ethnicity. Since the violence, we and NATO have reaffirmed our
determination to protect the Serb community, its churches, monasteries, and
historic sites. I had a chance to make this point directly to an impressive
delegation from the Serbian Orthodox Church that I met last month, a group that
included Father Irinej who will speak to you later today.
Since March 2004 Kosovo has made some progress in many of the technical
aspects of developing a multi-ethnic society. For example, the Assembly passed
an Anti-Discrimination Law and the government is now training judges and
prosecutors on its enforcement. The government developed an action plan for the
protection of Kosovo's multi-ethnic cultural heritage and is completing an
inventory of all its cultural heritage sites. The government set aside ten and a
half million Euros of its own funds to support the return of displaced persons,
focusing on those, mostly Serbs, displaced by the March 2004 violence. And, a
majority of municipalities drafted local strategies to encourage returns and
appointed municipal returns officers. These are encouraging initiatives, but
they are only the beginning. Full implementation of the detailed work plan for
the standards is a major undertaking that will take years, not months. We will
continue to assist the people of Kosovo in this effort, which will contribute to
their ability to meet the rigorous membership criteria of European and
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The key indicator of progress, however, will be the commitment of Kosovo’s
Albanians to create a multi-ethnic Kosovo that fully includes Serbs, setting the
conditions for those who fled to return and live in safety. As our outstanding
chief of mission in Pristina, Phil Goldberg, said, “The road signs will be in
Serbian as well as Albanian. The question is whether they point the way for
displaced Serbs to return to their homes, or direct them out of Kosovo.” In
recent months, Kosovo Albanian leaders have taken positive steps in this area.
In February, then Prime Minister Haradinaj and municipal leaders issued a joint
declaration urging the displaced Serbs to return and encouraging Kosovo
Albanians to accept and implement their special responsibilities towards
Kosovo's minority communities. The Minister of Local Government and the Minister
of Returns, himself a Serb, traveled to displaced persons camps to encourage
returns. Kosovo Serb leaders told Contact Group representatives visiting in
April that there had been no major incidents threatening their freedom of
movement in the preceding three months. The Albanian Minister of the Environment
traveled to the Decani monastery, one of the most prominent Serbian Orthodox
sites in Kosovo, on Orthodox Easter and addressed the church leadership in
Serbian with a message of reconciliation.
Now Kosovo’s leaders must institutionalize these efforts and ensure their
continuation, most significantly by decentralizing government. By moving control
of issues such as health, education, law enforcement and justice to the local
level, local communities can have control of the elements of daily life most
essential to preserving their identity and rights. Decentralization will benefit
all of Kosovo's citizens, but will be especially important for advancing the
rights of Kosovo Serbs as well as Roma and other minorities, and for encouraging
returns. Displaced Serbs want to know that they will have a voice in the issues
that matter to them most and the security to exercise their rights before
deciding to return. At the same time, all of these local structures must be
accountable to Pristina, not Belgrade. The parallel, Belgrade-funded
institutions, most notably in Mitrovica, must be dismantled or integrated into
Kosovo’s structures.
As we urge Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo to take the hard decisions to create
a multi-ethnic society, the United States has provided significant support to
these efforts. The United States is providing roughly $75 million in assistance
to Kosovo under the Support for Eastern European Democracies (SEED) program.
About half of that money goes to security though the UN civilian police mission
and the other half is targeted to assist with implementing the standards,
especially those focused on multi-ethnicity. We have offered to make $1 million
of those funds available specifically to support decentralization programs. We
provide an additional three and a half million dollars to support returns in
Kosovo. On May 13, the United States pledged $1 million to a UNESCO effort to
protect all of Kosovo’s religious and historical sites, including especially
Serb sites, to ensure the preservation of Kosovo’s rich cultural and ethnic
heritage.
The economy is a significant challenge for all the people of Kosovo, where
unemployment runs at 60 percent or higher. Huge swaths of the economy are
outside of formal structures, making them ripe targets for corruption and
organized criminal activities. Investment and development are constrained by
unreliable basic services that we take for granted, like electricity and
telephone systems. Large and inefficient state enterprises are still not
privatized and foreign investors are waiting for greater political clarity and
decisions on Kosovo’s sovereignty before investing. The UN, after much delay,
promulgated rules on eminent domain and land tenure that will allow
privatization and other essential economic programs to move forward. With its
status unresolved, however, Kosovo is not eligible for the IMF or World Bank
assistance that it so urgently needs to develop a stable economy.
Kosovo’s unresolved status hampers not only the economy, but further
progress on its core goals. Many displaced Serbs are unwilling to return to
their homes until there is clarity about Kosovo's future status. Kosovo’s
Albanian population also will not wait idly by while Kosovo’s status remains
unresolved. As I’ve said, the status quo is neither sustainable nor desirable
for all involved, including the United States – we have 1800 American troops
assigned to the NATO-led KFOR and a UN mission that cost us $74 million last
year. By defining a political framework for Kosovo’s future, we believe more
rapid progress can be made in building a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and
market-oriented Kosovo.
The Way Forward We have been working actively with our fellow members of the Contact Group --
the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom – to implement
our vision for Kosovo. Together, the Contact Group brings significant political
and diplomatic weight to bear on the issue. We regularly visit the region and
meet on both sides of the Atlantic to plan the way forward. Ten years ago, the
Balkans were a source of significant trans-Atlantic tension, but today the
Balkans are one of the areas were we cooperate most effectively. I expect that
the Contact Group will continue its activity on Kosovo and look forward to
future meetings with my counterparts to advance our policy.
When I met with my Contact Group counterparts in London last month, I found
unanimous agreement to move forward with the comprehensive review this summer.
The UN Secretary General will appoint a person to conduct the review, we hope
shortly after Mr. Jessen-Petersen’s appearance at the Security Council on May
27. The Contact Group strongly endorsed Kai Eide for the job. The review will
look not only at the technical fulfillment of the standards, but also at the
larger political issues. It will be based on information from a wide range of
sources, including visits to the region and discussion with key international
actors in Kosovo. We expect it will take six to eight weeks to complete the
review and several more weeks to draft the report, which we hope can be
completed by late summer. While the result of the review is not a foregone
conclusion, we are hopeful that Kosovo is on course to a positive review. Mr.
Jessen-Petersen noted in recent reports to the Security Council this positive
trend overall on standards implementation, but also that more work remains to be
done, particularly on implementing the first stages of decentralization.
We expect the Contact Group and the UN to meet this fall to consider the
results of the comprehensive review and to decide whether to launch a political
process to determine Kosovo’s final status. If the result of the review is
sufficiently positive, the United States will advocate a swift launch of status
talks. We believe a senior European political figure, appointed by the UN in
consultation with the Contact Group, should lead the process. While some names
have been mentioned, the United States has not yet decided to endorse a specific
candidate. I have told the Contact Group that the U.S. will offer a senior
American diplomat to serve as deputy to the status envoy and Secretary Rice is
currently considering possible candidates for this role.
The exact shape of a status process remains undefined, in part to allow the
envoy the flexibility to create a format that he or she believes will promote
the most success. However, the Contact Group has already identified three
essential elements for Belgrade and Pristina: status talks will involve dialogue
between Belgrade and Pristina; Kosovo’s Serbs and other minority communities
will have a role in the process; and all parties are expected to refrain from
obstructing the process.
The negotiations will be difficult. Passions run high on both sides and
opening positions are likely to be diametrically opposed. Kosovo’s Albanians
continue to demand immediate and unconditional independence without any
discussion of the modalities. Belgrade has a slogan of “more than autonomy,
but less than independence” but has yet to define what that means. Think tanks
and non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group and
the International Commission on the Balkans have placed ideas on the table,
often advocating some type of phased and conditioned approach to eventual
independence for Kosovo. -- Be based on multi-ethnicity with full respect for human rights including
the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in
safety; We also made clear that we expect that the international civilian and
military presences would continue in place past a status settlement to ensure
its full implementation and to monitor the political and security situations for
Kosovo’s minorities. We are discussing with our friends in the European Union
placing an EU focus on the international efforts following a status settlement,
even while the United States remains an active partner in Kosovo and throughout
the region. We have invested too much and have too important a stake in the
success of Kosovo and the region – and in our partnership with Europe – to
do otherwise.
Once agreement has been reached on Kosovo’s final status, we would expect
to return to the UN Security Council to seek a new resolution that moves us
beyond 1244 and endorses the main results of the status talks. While we have not
set a specific timetable for the process, we would hope to be able to bring a
settlement to the Security Council sometime before the end of next year.
The Role of Belgrade Whatever Kosovo’s final status, Belgrade will have to accept some change
from the pre-1999 situation. The process to decide Kosovo’s final status also
affords us an opportunity to help Serbia move back into the European mainstream
where it belongs. For over 15 years, first under the despotic rule of Slobodan
Milosevic and then handicapped by his legacy, Serbia could not serve as a
constructive agent for regional growth and stability. Kosovo is a burden
weighing Serbia down.
Serbia and Montenegro wants to be part of Europe as President Marovic made
clear when he said, “Our goal is to join the process for integration into the
European Union as soon as possible as well as the Partnership for Peace....Serbia
and Montenegro will not let this chance for a European future go by.” And
indeed, Europe wants to welcome Serbia and Montenegro back into the fold. At the
2003 Thessaloniki Summit, EU leaders stated that they would welcome all the
states of the Balkans as future EU members. Italian Foreign Minister Fini said
recently, “Forging a common identity and outlook for the Balkans is a
responsibility that Europe must accept if it wishes to measure up to its
historic mission: that of offering continuous prospects for peace, prosperity
and stability to the peoples of the entire continent.” We support this
reconciliation between Europe and Serbia and Montenegro and will do what we can
to facilitate its success.
We have been explicit with Belgrade; constructive engagement in the Kosovo
status process, full cooperation with the ICTY (especially in the apprehension
and transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic), a continued
cooperative attitude toward the state union with Montenegro, and a constructive
regional role, notably in Bosnia, would help clear the path to EU and NATO
membership. How fast Belgrade moves down that path depends entirely on how well
it cooperates in these areas. Recent signs are encouraging: Belgrade has taken
steps to effect the transfer of twelve indictees this year to the Hague, opening
the way for the European Union to announce its willingness to pursue a
Stabilization and Association Agreement as part of Serbia and Montenegro’s
preparations to apply for European Union membership. We hope that these positive
steps continue, particularly in relation to Belgrade’s efforts to locate and
arrest Ratko Mladic.
Let me be clear, we are not rewarding Belgrade for doing what it should do in
these areas. Rather, we are trying to define for government leaders in Belgrade
what the international community expects from them and to show them the tangible
benefits and opportunities that await them as they move forward towards the EU
and NATO. We are examining what NATO can offer in this area, but we remain firm
that Belgrade cannot join the Partnership for Peace until Ratko Mladic is in The
Hague. However, we believe that the possibility of closer relations with the EU
will be the bigger prize for the Serbian body politic. Therefore, we are
encouraging our European partners to develop a bold and creative package that
translates the benefits of advancing toward EU membership into terms
understandable to the average person in Serbia.
Conclusion
Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
you for the invitation to appear before you to discuss the current situation in
Kosovo and our vision for progress and peace there in the coming months.
2005 is an important year for the people of the Balkans. They and we will
commemorate on July 11 the tenth anniversary of the horrible massacre at
Srebrenica where nearly 8,000 men and boys were killed. In November, we will
observe the tenth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords. In Kosovo, nearly all
agree the time has come for progress in determining its political future.
Six years ago, the United States led the NATO Allies in a successful
campaign to end Slobodan Milosevic’s reign of terror in Kosovo and halt his
attempted ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population of Kosovo. Milosevic
manipulated Serb history in Kosovo to support his rise to power and was
convinced that the world thought as little of its Albanian population as he did.
Only force could stop his murderous plans, so NATO took action. Following the
military air campaign and the forced withdrawal of Serb security forces, Kosovo
was effectively made a ward of the international community – administered by
the UN and secured by NATO – with its future status left to later
determination. We believed that the divisions in the region would not permit a
negotiation on Kosovo’s future status at that time. Today the UN continues to
administer Kosovo and NATO troops continue to provide security.
Earlier, I characterized 2005 as a year of decision for Kosovo. In
November 2003, my predecessor, Marc Grossman, laid out to the region a
comprehensive strategy to move us beyond rote repetition of the UN-crafted
slogan “standards before status.” He outlined a process of regular reviews
of progress on the standards, leading to a comprehensive review of progress in
mid-2005. A sufficiently positive review would then lead to a process to resolve
Kosovo’s status. The UN Security Council endorsed this approach in a December
2003 Presidential Statement. Regardless of when we launch a status process, the
work of Kosovo’s leadership on the standards will continue. Further
implementation of the standards is essential for all the people of Kosovo to
live in the kind of society they deserve, and for Kosovo to meet the rigorous
criteria for Euro-Atlantic integration. As my good friend, Ambassador Kai Eide
of Norway, noted in his excellent report to UN Secretary General Annan last year,
we are effectively moving to an approach of “standards with status.”
In order to preserve our role as facilitators of a negotiated solution, the
United States and our partners in the Contact Group have not advocated any
specific outcome for status talks, but we have identified some basic principles
that should guide a settlement of Kosovo’s final status. We ruled out a return
to the situation before March 1999 and made clear that Kosovo’s final status
must enhance regional stability and contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration
of the Balkans. Accordingly, Kosovo’s final status must:
-- Offer effective constitutional guarantees to ensure the protection of
minorities;
-- Include specific safeguards for the protection of cultural and religious
heritage; and
-- Promote effective mechanisms for fighting organized crime and terrorism.
Additionally, the Contact Group told the parties that we believe that Kosovo’s
final status must:
-- Not be decided by any party unilaterally or result from the use of force;
-- Not change the boundaries of the current territory of Kosovo, either through
partition or through a new union of Kosovo with any country or part of any
country after the resolution of Kosovo’s status;
-- Fully respect the territorial integrity of all other states in the region;
-- Ensure that Kosovo continues to develop in a sustainable way both politically
and economically; and
-- Ensure that Kosovo does not pose a military or security threat to its
neighbors.
Belgrade’s role in this process must be one of continued constructive
engagement. Any undue delay or obstruction would require us to reevaluate
Belgrade’s role. We call on Belgrade to support Kosovo’s Serbs taking their
seats in the Assembly and resuming participation in Kosovo’s institutions and
political life, ending their Belgrade-imposed isolation. Kosovo Serbs should
have a direct voice in decisions that affect their daily life. We welcome the
resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina technical dialogue on missing persons,
returns and other issues. These humanitarian concerns should not be hostage to
politics. Serbian President Tadic offered to meet with President Rugova and we
continue efforts to facilitate such a meeting, but stress that Belgrade should
not see it as a way to circumvent status discussions.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, many in Europe believed that Yugoslavia would lead the former communist
countries down the path of reform and would be the first to join the EU. The
murderous policies of Milosevic and others prevented that and instead created
Europe’s most divisive conflicts and worst human rights abuses since the
Second World War. We have an opportunity this year to move past the legacy of
the last 15 years and accelerate the integration of the Balkans into the great
Trans-Atlantic community. Working closely with our Allies and the people of the
region, we will help write a new chapter to a story that began with the breakup
of Yugoslavia and a series of tragic wars – wars that ended only after the
collective action of the world’s greatest alliance – NATO. A Kosovo solution
coupled with a commitment to active engagement with a Serbia that fulfills its
international obligations will move us closer to President Bush’s vision of a
Europe whole, free and at peace – the great strategic objective of our policy
in Europe.