07052006

Partia "Lëvizja e Legalitetit"
Bulevardi "Zog I", Tiranë.
legaliteti@gmail.com
Tel&Fax: +355 4 230076

Sot, më datë 07/05/2007, PLL i ka dërguar Komisionit të Politikës së Jashtme të Kuvendit të Shqipërisë, propozimin me shkrim për shtesë në rezolutën mbështetëse të pavarësisë së Kosovës, lidhur me përfshirjen në këtë rezolutë edhe të solidarizimit me qëndrimin dinjitoz të z.Haradinaj përballë akuzave të Tribunalit të Hagës.

Ne shprehim kënaqësinë që Komisioni Juaj po punon për hartimin e një rezolute, ku shprehet mbështetja e Kuvendit të Shqipërisë ndaj propozimit që i dërguari special i Kombeve të Bashkuara për Kosovën, z.Ahtisaari, i paraqiti Këshillit të Sigurimit të OKB, ku parashihet pavarësia e Kosovës.

Duke qenë në mbështetje të plotë të kësaj rezolute, ne dëshirojmë të sjellim në vëmendjen Tuaj edhe një fakt tjetër, që ka të bëjë me procesin e montuar që po zhvillohet në Gjykatën e Hagës ndaj z.Ramush Haradinaj, ish drejtues i lartë i UçK dhe Kryeministër i Kosovës.

Ne nuk mund të pranojmë faktin se, ndërsa kriminelët Mlladiç dhe Karaxhiç, dhe plot të tjerë si ata, bredhin të lirë nëpër Serbi, ndërkohë që luftëtarët e lirisë së Kosovës shqiptare, sikundër z.Haradinaj, që luftuan për lirinë e popullit të tyre në bashkëpunim me NATO-n, sot të përballen me akuza dhe shpifje të fabrikuara në Beograd. Dhe kjo ndodh akoma pa u tharë gjaku i 20 mijë viktimave të gjenocidit, djegia e mbarë Kosovës, përdhunimet dhe deportimi i mbi 1 milion shqiptarëve..., krime këto që protektorët e serbëve po duan t'i shlyejnë vetëm me akuzimin dhe dënimin e parealizuar të Millosheviçit.

Duke pasur besimin e plotë se kryeministri Haradinaj, i zgjedhur edhe me miratimin e bashkësisë ndërkombëtare, dhe i cilësuar prej saj si partner i denjë dhe qeveritar i suksesshëm, është plotësisht i pafajshëm dhe do ta fitojë këtë pafajësi në Hagë, ne kërkojmë nga Ju që, në Rezolutën përkatëse që po hartoni për Pavarësinë e Kosovës, të shprehet edhe vlerësimi i Kuvendit të Shqipërisë ndaj kontributit në luftë dhe aktit të vetëdorëzimit të z. Haradinaj në Gjykatën e Hagës, si dhe bindja jonë e përbashkët për pafajësinë e tij.

Ne kemi bindjen se, duke vepruar kështu, Kuvendi i Shqipërisë shpreh mirënjohjen e tij për gjithë luftën heroike të UçK dhe të luftëtarëve të saj, duke realizuar një detyrim minimal të shtetit amë.

Partia "Lëvizja e Legalitetit"
Bulevardi "Zog I", Tiranë.
legaliteti@gmail.com
Tel&Fax: +355 4 230076

Sot paradite, kryetari i Partisë "Lëvizja e Legalitetit" Ekrem Spahiu dha një konferencë për shtyp ku shprehu pikëpamjet e kësaj partie në lidhje me deklaratat shoviniste greke për Vori-Epirin, pavarësinë e Kosovës, procesin ndaj z. Ramush Haradinaj, rezolutën e pritshme të Kuvendit të Shqipërisë dhe vizitën e Presidentit Bush në Shqipëri.

Më poshtë po ju përcjellim të plotë tekstin e deklaratës së lexuar prej tij me këtë rast.

Partia "Lëvizja e Legalitetit", si një parti e përkushtuar ndaj çështjes kombëtare, ka si prioritet programor mbrojtjen dhe zgjidhjen e kësaj çështjeje, për çka ajo në mënyrë të vazhdueshme ka kontribuar e sakrifikuar që nga krijimi i saj e deri në ditët e sotme, si brenda, ashtu edhe jashtë vendit.

Partia "Lëvizja e Legalitetit" shpreh indinjatë të thellë për rezonancën dhe amplifikimin që ambasadori grek në Shqipëri z.Kokosis i bëri deklaratës luftënxitëse të Bollanos, aq më tepër në kushtet kur Greqia vazhdon të mbajë në fuqi Ligjin e Luftës me Shqipërinë.

Ne shpresojmë se këta dy tellallë të kauzës së "Vorio-Epirit", të kenë shprehur vetëm pikëpamjet dhe qëndrime vetjake shoviniste, dhe jo qëndrimet zyrtare të Athinës, e cila, sa më parë duhet ti përgënjeshtrojë këto deklarata, që dëmtojnë jo vetëm marrëdhëniet normale midis dy vendeve, por edhe vetë minoritetin grek në Shqipëri. Ne jemi të bindur se këto qëndrime të bashkërenduara edhe me qarqe e qeveri sllave, përdoren si kundërpeshë antishqiptare pikërisht në momentin e pavarësimit të Kosovës.

PLL shpreh bindjen se krijimi i shtetit të Kosovës është një proces i pakthyeshëm, që do t'i shërbejë paqes, stabilitetit dhe integrimit të të gjithë vendeve të rajonit në strukturat euro-atlantike.

Partia "Lëvizja e Legalitetit" gjen rastin të falënderojë të gjithë ato vende mike dhe personalitete të shquara të botës demokratike, për gjithçka kanë bërë dhe po bëjnë për zgjidhjen e drejtë të çështjes së Kosovës. E drejta historike dhe qëndrimi dinjitoz i popullit shqiptar të Kosovës, që nga rezistenca e tij paqësore dhe deri tek ajo e armatosur për të përballuar agresionin serb dhe spastrimin etnik, kanë fituar meritueshëm simpatinë dhe mbështetjen e tyre.

Me këtë rast, ne legalistët u shprehim mirënjohje të përjetshme luftëtarëve të UÇK dhe drejtuesve të saj, të cilët me gjakun dhe sakrificat e tyre bënë të mundur që pavarësia e Kosovës të bëhet një realitet i prekshëm.

Partia "Lëvizja e Legalitetit" shpreh solidaritet të veçantë për kryeministrin e Kosovës z.Ramush Haradinaj, i cili po përballet denjësisht me akuza të montuara në një proces gjykimi të paragjykuar. PLL nuk mundet dhe nuk do ta pranojë faktin që, ndërsa kriminelët Mlladiç dhe Karaxhiç bredhin të lirë nëpër Serbi, luftëtarët si z.Haradinaj, që luftuan për lirinë e popullit të tyre në bashkëpunim me NATO-n, sot të përballen me akuza dhe shpifje të fabrikuara në Beograd, akoma pa u tharë gjaku i 20 mijë viktimave të gjenocidit, djegia e mbarë Kosovës, përdhunimet dhe deportimi i mbi 1 milion shqiptarëve, krime këto që po duan t'i shlyejnë vetëm me akuzimin dhe dënimin e pa realizuar të Millosheviçit.

Ne legalistët kemi bindjen dhe besimin e plotë se kryeministri Haradinaj, i zgjedhur edhe me miratimin e bashkësisë ndërkombëtare dhe i cilësuar prej saj si partner i denjë dhe qeveritar i suksesshëm, do të fitojë pafajsinë në Hagë, për t'u rikthyer triumfator në atdhe dhe në detyrë, në përmbushje të vullnetit të popullit të Kosovës.

PLL shpreh kënaqësinë e saj që Komisioni i Jashtëm i Kuvendit të Shqipërisë mori në konsideratë kërkesën e përsëritur të legalistëve për miratimin sa më parë të një rezolute për pavarësinë e Kosovës. Ne legalistët shprehim bindjen e palëkundur se në këtë rezolutë shumë të rëndësishme për momentin historik të pavarësimit të Kosovës, do të përfshihet edhe mbështetja politike e Kuvendit të Shqipërisë për pafajësinë e luftëtarit dhe kryeministrit Ramush Haradinaj, për gjithçka ai ka bërë për lirinë e atdheut.

PLL, me rastin e shumëpritur dhe të deklaruar të vizitës së Presidentit Bush në Tiranë, shpreh kënaqësinë, mirënjohjen dhe falënderimin e thellë për popullin dhe qeverinë amerikane, për mbështetjen shekullore ndaj shqiptarëve dhe kauzës së tyre në Ballkan.

Legalistët e vlerësojnë vizitën e Presidentit Bush si një mbështetje madhore për stabilitetin politik të vendit dhe domosdoshmërinë e vazhdimit të reformave në të gjitha fushat.

PLL ka dhe ushqen bindjen se, edhe në të ardhmen, SHBA-të do të mbeten aleatë dhe partnerë strategjikë të kombit shqiptar, për zgjidhjen hap pas hapi të çështjes tonë kombëtare, si dhe për zhvillimin dhe konsolidimin e proceseve demokratike në Shqipëri e në mbarë hapësirën shqiptare në rajon.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 83, Part II, 7 May 2007

GERMANY WARNS KOSOVA AGAINST UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE... German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung on May 4
expressed confidence that the UN Security Council will back a
proposal granting Kosova independence from Serbia, Radio-Television
Kosova reported the same day. However, the AP also quoted Jung as
saying that "a unilateral declaration of independence would be a
mistake for the moment," and as urging Kosovars to be patient in
their pursuit of independence. "Our goal is to finish discussions [on
a UN resolution] by the end of May," Jung said. Germany itself is not
a member of the Security Council, but it is nonetheless a key player
in international efforts to resolve the status of Kosova. Germany is
one of the six members of the Contact Group leading diplomatic
efforts, currently holds the EU's Presidency, and German diplomats
head the international community's missions in Kosova and in Bosnia.
Jung was in Kosova to visit German troops in the roughly
16,000-strong NATO-led force in the region. Of the 35 states that
have sent troop contingents to Kosova, Germany has one of the
largest. The current number -- which changes each week -- is roughly
2,300. A number of European states have warned against a unilateral
declaration of independence, but the United States has made clear it
would support such a move if the Security Council were to veto the UN
blueprint (see "RFE/RL Newsline," April 18, 27, and 30, 2007). AG

..WHILE KOSOVA SECURES FRESH SUPPORT IN UN. Another member of the
15-strong UN Security Council has said it will back a UN proposal
granting Kosova independence from Serbia, Kosovar media reported on
May 3. Radio-Television Kosovo reported that an unnamed Panamanian
official has assured Veton Surroi, a member of the team negotiating
Kosova's future, that Panama supports the plan drawn up by UN envoy
Martti Ahtisaari and believes that a decision should be made now
instead of reopening talks. Surroi also indicated after meeting with
Panama's deputy foreign minister, Ricardo Duran, that this is
Panama's official position. To pass, the plan requires Russia and
China not to veto the plan, and a total of nine votes. The extent of
support for the proposal is unclear. The United States and the EU
have both backed the proposal for supervised independence for Kosova.
Together, Washington and EU member states have six votes. However,
Slovakia's political elite has sent mixed signals, and Kosovar
Albanian media recently reported with concern a May 3 commentary in
the German newspaper "Frankfurter Rundschau" that claimed, without
providing sources, that Slovakia -- along with Russia -- will
"definitely" oppose such a proposal. If Slovakia votes with its EU
peers and Panama backs the proposal, a resolution would require two
additional votes from among China, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru,
Qatar, Russia, and South Africa. AG

FRACTURES EMERGE IN ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT. Signs that Albania's
government is increasingly shaky were compounded on May 4 when a
junior member of the coalition suspended its support for Prime
Minister Sali Berisha's Democratic Party. Local media reported that
the Christian Democrats decided to freeze all contact with the
Democrats because the latter have breached an agreement not to put up
a candidate in one district in February's local elections. Though a
member of the coalition government, the Christian Democrats hold no
portfolios in the government, and control just two seats in the
140-member parliament. However, the rift within the coalition comes
at a particularly inopportune moment for Berisha. The Democrats have
in recent days also suffered from the resignation of the foreign
minister and, on May 3, from the defection of one of their members of
parliament, Gillman Bakalli, who is now widely expected to join the
Christian Democrats (see "RFE/RL Newsline," April 25, 2007).
Meanwhile, Berisha is seeking to win support from the opposition for
his candidate for the presidency, but members of the leading
opposition party, the Socialists, are calling increasingly loudly for
early parliamentary elections (see "RFE/RL Newsline," May 4, 2007).
Berisha told local media on May 3 that early general elections are "a
last option." Albanians last voted in parliamentary elections in July
2005. Parliament is scheduled to elect a new president in June. U.S.
President George Bush is due to arrive in Albania on June 10, putting
extra pressure on Albania's politicians to reach a consensus on their
choice of president. AG

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 82, Part II, 4 May 2007

U.S. SAYS DIVISIONS OVER KOSOVA 'NOT INSURMOUNTABLE'... A meeting of
the six-country Contact Group heading efforts to resolve the status
of Kosova ended on May 2 without official statements, but reports by
Voice of America and international news agencies say U.S. officials
believe differences are "not insurmountable." The reports cite
unnamed officials close to U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns, the third-most-senior figure in the State Department. One
official pointed to a statement by Burns that the UN's plan for the
contested region will soon go to the UN Security Council in the form
of a resolution as "indicative of the fact that we [U.S. officials]
do think that differences or concerns that the Russians have can be
bridged." Russia has previously threatened to veto a resolution that
ignores Belgrade's demand that Kosova should remain part of Serbia,
albeit with substantial autonomy (see "RFE/RL Newsline," April 25,
2007). The leaders of the United States and the EU on May 1 called
for a swift solution (see "RFE/RL Newsline," May 2, 2007). To pass,
the plan requires Russia and China not to veto the plan, and a total
of nine votes from the 15-member council. The council includes the
United States, five European states, three African countries (Congo,
Ghana, and South Africa), and also Indonesia, Panama, Peru, and
Qatar. AG

..WHILE UN ENVOY SAYS PLAN ONLY WAY FORWARD. The author of the UN's
proposed settlement for Kosova, Martti Ahtisaari, has insisted that
his plan is the only viable possibility, AFP reported on May 3.
Ahtisaari, who was in London but did not attend the meeting of the
Contact Group, added that "I would find it extremely difficult to
think that today's Russia would like to send a message to the world,
by opposing the implementation of the plan in the Security Council,
that any dictator like [late Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic
can deal with their citizens as he or she likes and hide behind
sovereignty." The UN has administered the nominally Serbian province
since 1999, when NATO-led troops intervened to halt fighting between
ethnic Albanian separatists and Serbian security forces and the
accompanying mass movement of refugees. Ahtisaari, who led talks
between Prishtina and Belgrade for over a year before submitting his
recommendation, said further negotiations would be pointless (see
"RFE/RL Newsline," February 5 and March 8, 2007).

UN MISSION SAYS KOSOVA'S COMMUNITIES STILL FAR APART. The head of a
recent fact-finding mission dispatched to Kosova by the UN Security
Council, Belgian UN Ambassador Johan Verbeke, told the council on May
2 that "sustained efforts" would be needed to build a multiethnic
society in Kosova, according to a UN press release issued after the
meeting (see "RFE/RL Newsline," May 30, 2007). In a statement that
amplifies comments he made as the mission left Kosova, Verbeke said
that all the Kosovar Serbs with whom the mission talked "firmly
opposed" independence from Serbia, while the ethnic Albanians
"expressed clear and unambiguous support" for the supervised
independence recommended by UN envoy Ahtisaari (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," February 5 and March 8, 2007). While the Albanian
community is confident about the future, Serbs are "more
apprehensive," he said. Physical isolation also separates the two
communities, Verbeke noted. He highlighted the low number of Kosovar
Serbs who have returned to the region since 1999 -- put at 2 to 5
percent by authorities in Belgrade -- as a key issue for Serbia,
which views this as evidence that the UN administration in Kosova has
failed to meet the mandate under which it assumed responsibility for
Kosova. Again, both sides differ in their view on whether "a
definition of the status of Kosovo would facilitate or hinder the
returns process," Verbeke said. AG

ENVOY HINTS EU OPPOSES EARLY ELECTIONS IN ALBANIA. The European
Union's ambassador to Albania, Helmut Lohan, has suggested that the
EU opposes snap elections being held in Albania, regional media
reported on May 2. Lohan said, "Albania needs a period of political
stability to move forward in accomplishing reforms under the
Stabilization and Association Agreement," a reference to the
preaccession agreement that the EU signs with candidates for
membership . Lohan was speaking with the minister responsible for
Albania's integration with the EU, Majlinda Bregu. Opposition figures
have suggested they will push for early elections if the next
president does not come from the opposition. The Albanian parliament
is due to elect a new president in June, and Prime Minister Sali
Berisha has acknowledged that his Democrat Party's candidate, Bamir
Topi, will need support from the opposition if he is to secure the 84
votes needed from the 140-member assembly (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
March 9 and 14, 2007). Berisha said on May 1 that he is willing to
enter talks with the opposition over the position, the dailies "Koha
jone" and "Shekulli" reported on May 2. However, the Socialist-led
opposition itself has yet to decide on a candidate, with deep-running
tensions emerging over the interest expressed in the post by Fatos
Nano, a former Socialist prime minister who has been critical of the
current party leader's centralizing plans (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
March 11, 2007). The last parliamentary elections were held in July
2005. AG

IS PARTITION THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME FOR KOSOVA?

By Patrick Moore

Many commentators have suggested that the Serbian-dominated
north of Kosova will break off from that province and become a part
of Serbia if the Albanian majority declares independence.
The idea of partitioning Kosova along ethnic lines is nothing
new. Some Serbian officials and academics toyed with the idea in the
early decades of the 20th century as a way of dealing with the Serbs'
declining demographic position there. More recent partition projects
were associated with the Serbian Academy of Sciences in the
mid-1980s.
In addition to securing Serbian-majority areas and cultural
and religious sites for the Serbian state, the partition planners
have generally sought to keep control of as much of the province's
mineral wealth for Belgrade as possible.
Some forms of de facto partition already exist in Kosova. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, when ethnic Albanian politicians held sway
in communist Kosova after decades of tough Serbian rule, many Serbs
left the province. They said they were victims of intimidation and
various forms of pressure to sell their land, although the Albanians
claimed the Serbs were happy to take the money and move to better
farms in Vojvodina.
In the wake of the 1998-99 conflict, much of the Kosovar
Serbian population fled their homes for Serbia proper or for what was
emerging as a heavily Serbian territory north of the Ibar River,
which divides Mitrovica into northern Serbian and southern Albanian
halves. Various Serbian enclaves remain throughout Kosova, but their
existence is often precarious.
Some Serbian refugees and displaced persons probably will
never go back to their former homes in what are now heavily Albanian
areas like Pristina. The Serbian ethnic-cleansing campaign of 1999 in
particular made heavy use of "human intelligence" on the ground that
only local Serbs could supply. Many Serbs who cooperated with former
Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's security forces
subsequently fled because they feared the wrath of their Albanian
neighbors.
Those Albanians also remember that it was the Serbs of Kosova
who formed the bedrock of support for Milosevic in his rise to power
in the mid-1980s and subsequently helped keep him there.
There has, moreover, been little communication across ethnic
lines since 1999. The younger generations of Serbs and Albanians
literally do not speak each other's languages because they never
experienced the joint school or military systems that Yugoslav-era
generations did.
Traditionally, few Serbs bothered to learn much Albanian, but
prior to the late 1980s, most Kosovar Albanians with anything more
than very basic schooling knew some Serbo-Croatian. All Kosovar males
who served in the Yugoslav military learned at least enough
Serbo-Croatian to conduct basic conversations and probably developed
their skills further if they were posted to Croatia or Bosnia or
somewhere else far from home.
The international community has long ruled out partition as
an option, saying that Kosova's future will be determined for the
province as a whole. Some observers have warned that if foreign
powers ever do allow the Serbian north to secede, they will pave the
way for similar partition attempts in the Presevo Valley, Macedonia,
or Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby opening a Pandora's box of Balkan
conflicts.
Whatever the merits of a Balkan domino theory might be, there
is at least one realistic scenario for Kosova that leaves open the
possibility of partition in the not-too-distant future. According to
that view, Russia will continue to stall on any serious consideration
by the UN Security Council of UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan for
conditional independence for Kosova. Moscow will go on calling for
holding debates, arranging fact-finding trips, appointing new
negotiators, and doing whatever else can be done to delay things.
In the meantime, according to this scenario, the Kosovar
Albanians will become increasingly impatient. Before young hotheads
or organized radicals take matters into their own hands and renew the
violence that shook the province in March 2004, the political leaders
will issue a unilateral declaration of independence. This will be
endorsed as the only practical alternative to protracted instability
by several members of the international community, including probably
the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, and some other states that
have already indicated their support for Kosovar independence.
Most of the EU member states will bicker among themselves and
not be able to act together, as has often happened in the past.
Serbia will use its old connections with the Nonaligned Movement and
its corps of experienced diplomats to ensure strong support for its
position among the developing countries. This could prove useful, not
only in the Security Council but also in the General Assembly, if and
when Pristina seeks membership in that body. The Kosovars have few
seasoned diplomats to plead their case except for publisher and
negotiator Veton Surroi.
At this point, so the theory goes, Russia and Serbia will
make it clear that they have been stalling in hopes of triggering a
declaration of independence by the Kosovars without Security Council
approval. Serbia will then invoke the council's Resolution 1244,
which specifies that Kosova is part of Yugoslavia. (Yugoslavia was
changed to Serbia in the text after Milosevic's rump Yugoslavia
ceased to be.) As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
has noted, the Western countries never meant the reference to Kosova
being part of Yugoslavia seriously but simply included it in 1244 as
a sop to Russia and Greece.
But that will not make any difference at this stage.
According to this scenario, Belgrade, backed by Moscow and perhaps
Beijing, will announce that it will invoke what it considers its
rights under 1244 and send its security forces and other officials
into northern Kosova to protect the Serbian population there from the
"illegal" regime in the south.
The partition will then be sealed, perhaps with the
assistance of foreign peacekeepers guarding the new boundary lines to
prevent any direct clashes between Serbian and Kosovar Albanian
forces.
The new Kosovar state will try to observe the provisions of
the Ahtisaari plan and protect the Serbian enclaves and cultural
properties because it knows that its international standing depends
on it. But the enclaves will likely fade away as the young in
particular move to the north, to Serbia proper, or even further away
still. The cultural properties will probably have to be protected
behind much barbed wire and guarded by French or Greek troops.
One of the lessons of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts of
the early 1990s was that Serbian populations outside Serbia had
difficulty accepting the possibility that Serbs could have happy and
productive lives in states that they did not control. That is clearly
the case in Kosova, too, particularly after 1998-99. It is probably
too much to expect that any Albanian-dominated Kosovar state would
ever attract even the grudging allegiance of the province's Serbs.
Partition would be a bitter pill for the Albanians to
swallow. They have said repeatedly that they will not accept it, but
they might find themselves with little choice. With the political
limbo of the UNMIK period behind them and a new legal system in
place, they will then get on with their own lives and go into
business as they have in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, or
Croatia. Neither they nor their former neighbors are likely to miss
each other.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 81, Part II, 3 May 2007

KOSOVARS MARCH IN SUPPORT OF HARADINAJ. Thousands of Kosovar
Albanians marched on May 2 to show their support for Ramush
Haradinaj, a former prime minister currently facing trial for war
crimes in The Hague. Local and international media estimated the
number of protesters marching through Prishtina at around 3,000. This
was just the latest of a number of rallies already staged in support
of Haradinaj. AP reported that the march, which was organized by
Haradinaj's party, the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK), a
member of the governing coalition, included a number of government
ministers. Haradinaj, the most prominent Kosovar Albanian to be
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), has been on trial since March facing charges that,
according to the indictment, "he established a system whereby
individuals were targeted for abduction, mistreatment, and murder,
and whereby a systematic attack on vulnerable sections of the
civilian population was carried out" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," March 2,
2007). In Kosova, Haradinaj is revered for his role as a leading
military commander in the 1998-99 conflict, while a former head of
the UN Mission in Kosova (UNMIK), Soren Jessen-Petersen, has credited
Haradinaj with moving the process of reconciliation between ethnic
Albanians and Serbs "forward in a way that nobody else has done."
There have been accusations by international prosecutors that
Haradinaj's perceived importance as a peacemaker prompted Western
diplomats and some UN officials to try and prevent a case being
brought against him (see "RFE/RL Newsline," March 2, 2007).
Haradinaj's status within Kosova, controversies over the relationship
of several UNMIK chiefs with Haradinaj, and the deaths of two
witnesses are seen as explanations for the reluctance of witnesses to
come forward to testify against Haradinaj (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
February 26 and March 2, 2007).

La Macédoine pourrait appuyer une reconnaissance unilatérale du Kosovo. C’est ce qu’a laissé entendre la semaine dernière Antonio Milososki, le Ministre macédonien des Affaires étrangères. Il a déclaré que, dans le cas d’un échec des efforts visant à résoudre la question devant le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU, et si des membres influents de l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne (UE) commençaient à reconnaître le Kosovo, la Macédoine devrait envisager sérieusement de suivre le mouvement [1].

Pour l’experte en questions de sécurité Biljana Vankovska, la déclaration d’Antonio Milososki ne constitue pas une surprise, puisque « le Plan B a toujours été le suivant : si le plan Ahtisaari n’est pas accepté à l’ONU, les Etats-Unis reconnaîtront le Kosovo et s’assureront du soutien à cette initiative de plusieurs pays de la région ».

« On peut donc s’attendre à ce que la Macédoine appuie la position des Etats-Unis, poursuit Biljana Vankovska, étant donné que le pays espère devenir membre de l’OTAN et que le gouvernement actuel aussi bien que l’ancien gouvernement ont toujours assuré qu’ils suivraient les initiatives américaines sur la question du Kosovo ».

Les Etats-Unis sont perçus par Skopje comme un allié majeur, surtout depuis qu’ils ont reconnu la Macédoine sous son nom constitutionnel, « République de Macédoine », une dénomination contestée depuis longtemps par la Grèce. Par ailleurs, les Etats-Unis soutiennent la volonté de la Macédoine de rejoindre l’OTAN.

Quelles conséquences pour Skopje ?

Le représentant spécial de l’ONU Martti Ahtisaari a proposé pour le Kosovo un statut d’indépendance supervisée. Si Pristina a accepté cette proposition, Belgrade l’a rejetée. Le gouvernement serbe propose plutôt d’offrir une large autonomie au Kosovo.

Officiellement, Skopje soutiendra toute solution acceptable par les deux camps et ne mettant pas en danger l’intégrité territoriale et la souveraineté de la Macédoine. Mais les dirigeants macédoniens n’excluent pas la possibilité que Skopje figure parmi les premières capitales à reconnaître le Kosovo si aucune solution n’était trouvée à l’ONU.

L’ex-Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires étrangères Emil Kirjas affirme que la question devrait être résolue au plus tôt, étant donné que « tout retard dans le dénouement de la question kosovare aura un impact négatif non seulement sur le Kosovo, mais aussi sur toute la région ». Il ajoute que « si nos principaux alliés à l’OTAN et dans l’UE décident de reconnaître unilatéralement le Kosovo, la Macédoine devrait sérieusement envisager cette option. »

Emil Kirjas ne s’attend pas à ce qu’une telle initiative ait de graves conséquences sur les relations entre la Macédoine et la Serbie. De son côté, Biljana Vankovska pense que le soutien à l’indépendance du Kosovo ouvrira la porte à des problèmes supplémentaires avec la Serbie, principalement en ce qui concerne l’identité macédonienne.

Par Krenar Gashi

Le Kosovo prévoit l’ouverture d’au moins 14 ambassades à travers le monde, dès que l’indépendance sous contrôle internationale détaillée dans le plan de l’ONU deviendra effective, ont confié au Balkan Insight des sources proches du bureau du Premier ministre.

En plus de l’ONU et de l’UE, le Kosovo a l’intention d’envoyer des ambassadeurs aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Italie, en Autriche, en Suisse, en Albanie, en Croatie, au Monténégro et en Slovénie. « Tous les préparatifs sont terminés », a assuré une de ces sources.

Si le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU adopte le plan sur le statut final du territoire durant l’été - et si la Russie ne met pas son veto, les ambassades du Kosovo devraient être sur pied et commencer leurs opérations début 2008, soit au même moment que le nouveau ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Cependant, l’hostilité de la Russie envers le plan de statut final ne représente pas la seule menace quant à l’établissement de ces nouvelles ambassades. Car, dans le cas de figure où le Kosovo obtiendrait son indépendance sans heurt, le manque d’argent et l’absence d’une élite professionnelle risquent de rendre la création de ces ambassades plutôt problématique.

En effet, le Kosovo ne jouit d’aucune expérience en tant qu’État indépendant et, a fortiori, en a encore moins dans le domaine des affaires étrangères. Assujetti à l’Empire ottoman pendant des siècles, le Kosovo a été incorporé à la Serbie en 1912 et est devenu une partie de la Yougoslavie après la Première guerre mondiale.

Après la Seconde guerre mondiale, le Kosovo a, pour la première fois, obtenu un gouvernement en tant que province autonome de la Yougoslavie. Au cours de cette période, plusieurs Kosovars albanophones ont acquis une expérience des affaires diplomatiques en travaillant au sein d’ambassades yougoslaves. Mais tout cela a pris fin brusquement lorsque le chef de l’État serbe, Slobodan Milosevic, a liquidé l’autonomie du Kosovo en 1989 et mené ensuite la fédération yougoslave à la dissolution. Depuis 1999, le Kosovo est devenu de facto un protectorat international administré par une mission de l’ONU, la MINUK.

Le régime des Nations Unies a progressivement transféré certaines compétences à des structures locales, appelées Institutions provisoires du gouvernement autonome (PISG). Celles-ci ont dorénavant la haute main sur l’administration, la culture et l’éducation. Toutefois, la résolution 1244 du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU sur le Kosovo, qui créait la MINUK, ne laisse aucune marge de manœuvre pour le développement d’un éventuel ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Ce qui veut dire qu’il n’existe aucune compétence à transférer dans ce secteur. Ainsi, une organisation spéciale, qui a été formée par le Premier ministre, Agim Ceku, dans le but de coordonner la période de transition, s’est vue chargée entre autres choses de l’élaboration d’un nouveau ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Avni Arifi, directeur de cette équipe de transition, a déclaré au Balkan Insight que son équipe travaillait énergiquement pour recruter de jeunes professionnels capables d’aider à faire fonctionner le nouvel État. « Nous avons mis sur pied des groupes de travail composés exclusivement de jeunes gens, éduqués à l’occidentale, qui ont pour tâches de préparer la transition », a expliqué Arifi.

Des sources au sein de l’équipe affirment de plus avoir rempli la plupart de leurs objectifs en ce qui concerne la création d’un futur ministère des Affaires étrangères. « Nous avons terminé les préparatifs d’ordre technique... Nous avons répertorié les équipements nécessaires et examiné toute la législation qui devra être adoptée ou modifiée », a précisé notre source interne. Tous les textes légaux relatifs à un ministère des Affaires étrangères ont été rédigés et n’ont besoin que de l’approbation officielle du Parlement du Kosovo pour entrer en vigueur.

Une autre source proche du bureau du Premier ministre a reconnu que des fonctionnaires européens aidaient à rédiger tous les articles de lois afin de s’assurer de leur conformité face aux normes internationales. « Les activités de préparation sont coordonnées avec l’Équipe de planification au Kosovo de l’UE (EUPT) », a-t-elle ajouté.

Reste alors la difficile question de l’origine des fonds nécessaires au budget de fonctionnement d’un ministère des Affaires étrangères. L’économie du Kosovo tourne à peine et le territoire dépend cruellement de l’aide internationale. Les fonctionnaires travaillent avec des contraintes strictes et une autre source a confié au Balkan Insight que le nouveau ministère des Affaires étrangères devra s’attendre à fonctionner avec un budget de seulement 7 M€ la première année.

Cela signifie donc que les diplomates du Kosovo seront les plus pauvres des Balkans. Il est vrai qu’on voit mal comment on pourra louer 14 locaux dans des capitales étrangères, où le coût de la vie est élevé - sans compter les salaires des employés -, avec une somme aussi modeste. Le budget annuel du ministère des Affaires étrangères britannique, par comparaison, représente approximativement 1,1 milliard de livres Sterling (1,6 milliard d’euros).

Outre l’argent, les ressources humaines font aussi défaut. Selon le bureau du Premier ministre, le gouvernement a pris contact avec l’Académie diplomatique de Vienne, une école supérieure de relations internationales, en vue de former le futur personnel diplomatique du Kosovo. Parmi une trentaine de stagiaires, « quinze seront sélectionnés pour devenir ambassadeurs », selon une source.

Mais Lulzim Peci, directeur de l’Institut kosovar pour la recherche et le développement de politiques publiques (KIPRED), à l’instar d’un expert des relations internationales, doute qu’un simple cours à Vienne soit suffisant. « Quelques mois de formation dans une académie à Vienne ne suffiront pas », a-t-il constaté. « Cela peut toujours vous procurer des bases cognitives et théoriques, mais le fait est que ces personnes vont vite se retrouver dans des situations de diplomatie réelle. »

Peci a soulevé un autre problème, celui de la culture de corruption et de népotisme bien ancrée au Kosovo, qui pourrait rapidement gangrener le ministère des Affaires étrangères et ainsi donner de piètres résultats. Il craint que des partis politiques ne placent leurs propres hommes dans les missions diplomatiques au lieu de laisser ce travail à des professionnels. « Le processus de sélection du personnel diplomatique devrait se dérouler d’après des critères stricts et en toute transparence », a ajouté Peci.

Après les fêtes du Premier mai, la Serbie, outre l’armée et de la police, pourrait compter une nouvelle formation militaire : la Garde du saint roi Lazar. Député et président du Mouvement des vétérans de Serbie, Zeljko Vasiljevic (SPS) affirme que cinq mille volontaires se sont déjà présentés. En cas de proclamation d’indépendance du Kosovo, ils seraient prêts à défendre les intérêts du peuple serbe.

Parmi eux, confirme Zeljko Vasiljevic, on compte plusieurs généraux et colonels en retraite qui, sur une base volontaire, élaborent une structure militaire, des plans opérationnels, les voies de circulation et les possible attaques. Parmi les fondateurs de la Garde, on mentionne, outre les vétérans, le Mouvement populaire uni du serbisme (srpstvo).

Les fondateurs parlent tantôt d’une milice chrétienne, qui comprendrait également des Albanais, tantôt d’une armée de libération, de sorte qu’on ne sait pas très clairement quelle sera au juste l’activité de cette nouvelle force armée. Tout deviendra probablement plus clair après la fête de Djudjevdan (la Saint-Georges, le 6 mai). Un rassemblement, dont la police de Krusevac a été avisée, devrait se tenir devant le portail de l’église de Lazarica.

Si la Serbie n’avait pas accumulé les expériences de la Garde volontaire serbe, des Tigres d’Arkan, des Scorpions, des Guêpes jaunes, des Aigles blancs et d’autres formations similaires, parmi lesquelles se trouvait aussi l’Unité pour les opérations spéciales, on pourrait hausser les épaules et penser qu’il s’agit de la vantardise d’un groupe d’aventuriers. Comme il y a en Serbie des milliers de gens qui ont guerroyé dans les années 1990 de tous les côtés, et qui possèdent des dizaines de milliers d’armes à tuer, il n’est pourtant pas recommandé de se moquer de cette initiative. D’ailleurs, derrière cette entreprise, se trouve un député du Parti socialiste qui, jusqu’à ce jour, n’a jamais renoncé à apporter son soutien au gouvernement technique du Premier ministre Vojislav Kostunica.

Que peut attendre l’Etat de la formation d’une garde non gouvernementale ? Rien d’autre que cela : une organisation armée non gouvernementale, qui se basera sur l’idéologie et le savoir des généraux et des colonels qui ont perdu quatre guerres. Nos dirigeants devraient pourtant bien savoir ce que signifierait le fait que ce ne soit qu’une escouade de volontaires qui partirait de Serbie pour le Kosovo, au lieu d’une armée régulière de 5 000 combattants...

Les soldats professionnels de l’OTAN les feraient fuir comme des lapins. Ensuite, il ne resterait plus qu’à revenir au terrain politique. Une question demeurerait néanmoins ouverte : est-ce que la Serbie veut déclarer la guerre à ceux qui sont venus établir la paix au Kosovo ? La réponse serait claire et les conséquences seraient fatales.

Les Gardes du prince Lazar attendent la bénédiction de l’Église, tout comme les Scorpions l’ont autrefois obtenue [1]. L’État ne se mêle pas des affaires ecclésiastiques, par conséquent il ne doit pas être gêné par le fait que certains dignitaires du clergé ne comprennent pas la politique et fassent quelque chose qui est contraire aux intérêts nationaux. L’État devrait uniquement se demander si tout cela est conforme aux lois et si la formation d’une nouvelle armée lui est utile. Dans l’impossibilité d’aller au Kosovo, cette armée pourrait commencer à guerroyer sur le terrain local. Celui qui possède des armes et veut la guerre peut facilement trouver des ennemis.